There are lessons for the BJP in Jharkhand loss. One, the party’s over-reliance on a single leader, Narendra Modi, for mobilizing votes, is problematic in the states. Voters clearly made a distinction between national and state elections and national trends are not necessarily replicated in the states: Local issues can carry greater salience in the assembly election than so called national issues. Modi and Amit Shah campaigned primarily on national issues, including the CAA and NRC, whereas the gathbandhan—the JMM, Congress and RJD—focused on local concerns, particularly unemployment and alienation of tribal, failure in the delivery of public goods.

The BJP projected Raghubar Das as its sole face in the state, but the move triggered dissent within the party. Two, the election may be read as a reminder of the usefulness of alliances in a fragmented polity. The gathbandhan’s success is largely the result of a well crafted coalition whereas the BJP, once famed for its skill in building alliances, was handicapped by the absence of allies. It failed to reach seat-sharing arrangement with All Jharkhand Students Union party (AJSUP), its partner, in office, and that hurt both the parties. The AJSUP mopped up nearly eight per cent of the vote.

States voting differently in general election and in the assembly poll is indication of a powerful federal impulse that seems to have survived the BJP push for centralization of politics and governance. The Maharashtra and Jharkhand outcomes suggest that ignoring regional factors, and parties, could prove costly.

In 2014 when the last Jharkhand assembly elections took place, BJP and its ally All Jharkhand Student Union sailed through with an absolute majority, riding the crest of BJP’s resounding success in the Parliament election earlier that year. In 2019, BJP won a similar resounding success in Parliament elections. But it has not been able to reap the same dividends in the Jharkhand assembly elections.

This time round, the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha-Congress- RJD alliance has secured an absolute majority. And, in these very divergent results, hangs the significance tale.

What went wrong for BJP in 2019 compared to what went right for it in 2014? First, there were a host of local factors at play. In 2019, BJP and AJSU fought not as allies but separately, underlining once again BJP’s inadequacies in managing alliance politics. Besides, the caste arithmetic which helped BJP on the last occasion seems not to have worked.

BJP’s support base is a combination of OBC and upper caste votes, with some collateral support from certain tribal groups. On the strength of this combination, BJP opted for the first time to have Raghubar Das, a non-tribal chief minister, in a state that has a 27% tribal population, and was hived off in 2000 from Bihar to specifically deal with tribal grievances. This gambit even though the OBC population in the state is 35%, seems to have failed.

In addition, there are verifiable reasons for a strong anti-incumbency mood against the BJP state government. Das, who lost his own elections this time against independent candidate, Saryu Roy, was not a particularly popular leader. His arrogant style of functioning was the talk of the state. Besides, his governance record was subpar. His attempt to push through changes in the land acquisition law was deeply resented by tribal areas, especially in the Santhal and south Jharkhand areas.

There was opposition too in his emphasis on linking PDS to Aadhar in a state where, given poverty illiteracy levels, the level of access to documentation is much lower. There was disaffection too, caused by steep decline in the mining and quarrying sectors, since these sectors provide very significant employment in Jharkhand. Finally, the state economy was moribund. According to the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy, 44% of all investment projects were stalled in Jharkhand, the highest rate in all of India. (IPA Service)