The reason for the edgy atmosphere in India, where the popular mood does not seem to be in favour of the talks, is not only 26/11, but also the belief that the Zardari-Gilani government is not fully in charge of the situation in Pakistan. As such, any agreement which may emerge will be virtually meaningless. As it is, the promises which the smooth-talking Pervez Musharraf gave earlier of not allowing Pakistani soil to be used for launching terrorist attacks on India have proved to be false. Now, with the less reliable Pervez Ashfaq Kayani in charge of the Pakistan army, there is even less likelihood of any such promise being either made or kept.

Yet, there is little option for India but to engage in at least a pretence of negotiations if only because a permanent moratorium on talks is not feasible. However untrustworthy a neighbour might be, some channels of communications have to be kept open. Otherwise, the onus of being unreasonable will be on India since it is the larger and a more stable and mature country in the eyes of the world.

There is another reason why India must keep its slender links with Pakistan open. It is that the Pakistan army would dearly love a deterioration in mutual ties, as after 26/11, so that it would not have to fulfil its obligations to continue to fight the terrorists in the country's north-west. Kayani was reluctant to undertake such operations in any event because, first, he regarded the terrorists as Pakistan's “strategic assets” against India and, secondly, an offensive against these “friendly” forces would have meant moving the army from the eastern and southern borders to the north-west.

Now, his unwillingness will be all the greater in view of the new US and NATO drive against the Taliban in the Helmand region. Since the American and West European forces are likely to force the Taliban to seek shelter in Pakistan, the West wants Kayani to fight the terrorists as they cross the Durand line to enter Pakistan. But irrespective of whether President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani want the army to take on the terrorists if only to avail of the aid which the Americans have threatened to keep on hold if Islamabad does not cooperate, Kayani himself will be not too eager.

And the only way he can stop his troops from moving towards the north-west is a sharp decline in Indo-Pak relations. It is not impossible that the terrorist outrage in Pune is a part of this army-ISI-terrorist game plan to provoke India. However, even if New Delhi's awareness of such a sinister plot makes it continue talking to Pakistan, it will mean that India can no longer take these exchanges very seriously. After all, a dialogue can only be meaningful if there is some possibility of a breakthrough or an indication of advancing towards an attainable goal.

Unfortunately, the emasculation of the civilian authority in Islamabad, not least because of the weakness of Mr. Ten Cent, and the apparent strengthening of the army-ISI-terrorist nexus are depriving the talks of any meaning. The only hope for India will be, first, to extract a promise of friendliness from Pakistan which can act as some kind of a check, however feeble, on the army if not the ISI and terrorist groups like the Lashkar-e-Toiba. Secondly, the talks, along with more people-to-people contacts, which have already started as a result of the peace initiative taken by two newspaper groups in India and Pakistan, may have a restraining impact on the army.

The talks, therefore, will be something like keeping a candle flickering in a stormy atmosphere. The storm clouds are the result of the Pakistan army's hope that after the exit of the Americans from the region, it will be back to the pre-9/11 situation when Afghanistan under the Taliban will be the base of the army and the terrorists for their offensive against India.

Given this gloomy context, it will not be realistic of India to expect Pakistan to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure, which has been New Delhi's longstanding demand. All that it can hope for at this lowest point in India-Pakistan relations is to persuade the Pakistani civil society to dilute the intensity of the army-ISI's animosity towards India and thereby curtail the virulence of the terrorists.(IPA)