“US-PAK STRATEGIC DIALOGUE”: A NEW PHASE BEGINS

From a surrogate state, which Richard Nixon sought to shield despite its savage onslaughts on the former East Pakistan populace, to a steep decline in ties during the second Bill Clinton presidency, marked a drastic rearrangement in their relationship. Simultaneously, Washington rapidly upgraded its ties with India just as it frowned on Pakistan as a veritable 'failed state'. This was reflected in the last visit of Bill Clinton to the sub-continent - five days of a warm State visit to India as against a five-hour stopover in Pakistan.

In between was another chapter, the Ziaul Haq phase, which coincided with the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan. Ziaul Haq was able to rescue Pakistan from a drift towards economic insolvency by willingness to pull the American chestnuts out of the fire in Afghanistan. Claiming the status of a frontline state, Ziaul Haq sought suitable rewards - 'aid', weapons and a pro-Pak tilt vis-à-vis India. A shrewd bargainer, he described the early American aid offers as 'peanuts' and pulled off handsome bounties from the United States, plus huge undisclosed benefits as a bonus. Pakistan's A.Q. Khan nuclear chapter was a product of this phase of US-Pak relations. But for Washington turning a blind eye on a hefty clandestine buildup of the Kahuta centrifuge plant, there was little possibility of Pakistan acquiring its limited nuclear weapon status.

And now opens a new phase of US-Pak relations. The “Strategic Partnership” meeting in Washington last mid-week was a high water-mark of the new phase. What are the factors at work which have brought about this turnaround?

America's war with Al Qaeda and their Taliban allies - now a virtual obsession with the USA - drives its policy makers to resurrect the drooping friendship with Pakistan. The war with the Taliban in Afghanistan is heavily dependent on Pakistan's collaboration. Add to that the role which Pakistan as a moderate Islamic state can play in the American quest to mend fences with the Muslim world, now badly mauled by a string of developments - from Palestine to the fight with Islamic extremism worldwide. While these are the twin facets that primarily drive American policy makers to resurrect relationship with Pakistan, Washington would also, for the sake of old time relations, not like Pakistan to go under and become a 'failed state'.

On the other hand, propelling Pakistani policy-makers - both the civilian government and the Army - is, above all, the economic factor. Insolvency stared Pakistan in the face as early as 2008; Pakistan government (and the Army) had no other option. It is this that forced General Ashfaq Kayani to bend low for American help, and launch an all-out war on the Taliban in Waziristan. The rivalry with India is a second factor moulding Pak policies. It is widely recognized that Pakistan has lost the race with India - support from USA alone may possibly retrieve their lost cause, partially.

There is quite a lot of commonality in this phase of US-Pak 'partnership' with the earlier Ziaul Haq manoeuvres. Ironically, Taliban and Afghanistan provide a common background. It was to rescue Afghanistan from the Soviet Union that Ziaul Haq offered Pakistani services for suitable rewards. The Taliban was built up as a joint endeavour - American arms and money, and the Pak army leadership to create this Frankenstein, the Taliban. Now, in a turnaround, the Al Qaeda /Taliban have become America's principal enemy, and Pakistan is offering help in dealing with the Taliban in Afghanistan. Provided Islamabad gets suitable rewards.

The Taliban now being the principal adversary of America in Afghanistan, the Pak army with its long relationship with Washington, is willing to offer its services in this confrontation, in lieu of a matching reward. 'Aid', hard cash, is of course the first, and most urgent requisite, to meet the economic crunch Pakistan faces. Besides financial aid, Pakistan hopes to get advanced military equipment from Washington as a gift. Although this equipment - from predator drones, unmanned aircraft, to surveillance equipment, etc. - is being sought in the name of fighting the Taliban, Islamabad is sure that this will upgrade its strength vis-à-vis India too. 'There are no guns that fire only in one direction' - this edict is Islamabad's philosophy too.

At the beginning of 2007, Pakistan obtained IMF loans to survive. When the IMF loan was exhausted, it had no way but to turn to the USA, its old friend, to stave off a calamity. There was no money for the Pak army itself, and so it offered to launch an onslaught on the Taliban in Waziristan - bordering Afghanistan - to help close the porous border with Afghanistan on the understanding that this war will be paid for. The Pak army has performed in Waziristan; the Pakistan Taliban has been badly mauled Though overtly complaining against civilian casualties from American drone strikes in the Taliban heartlands, the Pak regime - no less the army - have quietly surrendered a bit of sovereign rights - allowing American planes to slash Taliban targets inside Pak territory.

Now, Islamabad seeks matching rewards. The $ 7.5 billion dollars offered by USA in three tranches to stave off the Pak economic crisis after the IMF aid was exhausted was the first step. This money will soon be gobbled up. So, the Pak army is putting up a $ 35 billion bill for its heroics against the Pak Taliban. It wants ample rewards for the blood of 2500 Pak soldiers in this fight with the Pak Taliban. That forms the basis of the 'US-Pak Strategic Dialogue' - a new phase in US-Pak relationship.

There are a few peculiarities of this partnership. Taking a leaf from experience of the Ziaul Haq days, Pakistan is striking a hard bargain and is a bit reckless in staking claims - as with the bills of some $35 billion. Even if half the money comes, Pakistan will carry the day. The same applies to the demand for a civil nuclear deal. Nuclear claims can only push up Pakistan's status, and even if the deal does not come about, nothing will be lost. The Pak leaders are aware that past proliferation sins are still rankling the Americans. And so, the USA has in polite language told them an India-type nuclear deal is not possible. The Pak leaders however have a way of niggling and hope something will be gained by their nuclear posture. Say, a nuclear power station with American or Canadian technology - financed by Washington.

The other important aspect, besides a big aid package, in Islamabad's “wish-list” — advanced military equipment, including unmanned space craft, predator drones, surveillance equipment — is claimed to be needed in the war on the Taliban in the Waziristan border with Afghanistan, but could easily be diverted against India. …

On the American side too, there is a “trust deficit”, and so the Americans have told their Pak friends that accountability - of the way Pakistan spends the money and uses the military equipment - has to be in place. American audit will have the final say, and this the Pakistanis do not like. There is dispute pending on the second tranche, worth about $ 2 billion, because American audit disputes the expenses incurred by the Pakistan side on this account. Hopefully, Islamabad thinks, the Americans will not be too hard on their demand for 'audit' of the way the money is spent.

Here the commonalities with the Ziaul Haq phase end. There are political hurdles in the way of this “strategic alliance” which are difficult to negotiate. One relates to Pakistan's standing in Afghanistan, once the Americans quit. There is mounting pressure against the Indian role in Afghanistan's affairs too. The second political hurdle is in relation to India. While it is the Indian demand that Washington obtain compliance from Pakistan against Pak-based terrorist organizations, Pakistan seeks American help in resolving the Kashmir dispute in a way favourable to Islamabad.

New Delhi is exercised over several facets of the US-Pak “strategic relationship”. The Pak “wish-list” of course worries India a lot, understandably. The predator drones in particular, since these will alter the Indo-Pak military balance. India is also concerned about the political space that Washington yields in Afghanistan. Above all, India seeks American pressure on Pakistan to ensure squeezing out of terrorist outfits such as the Lashkar. (IPA Service)