The conflict between Russia and Ukraine—along with broader tensions involving Russia and Europe—has, to some extent, unfolded beneath the sea on the seabed. Russia is secretly—and without permission—checking the seabed infrastructure in Europe’s important waters. All this may be in preparation for causing trouble later.

In November 2022, an officially classified Russian ocean research vessel, the Admiral Vladimirsky, was spotted hanging around near wind farms and an oil field in Denmark and the United Kingdom (UK), off the Scottish coast. When journalists tried to talk to them at sea, men with masks on their faces showed up on the ship’s deck, carrying Russian-looking rifles and wearing vests that protect against bullets. An investigation revealed that the ship was part of an operation to map key undersea energy sites in the North Sea for possible sabotage.

In September 2022, the disruption of the Nord Stream 1 and 2 gas pipelines marked a resurgence of historical patterns where seabed infrastructure became targets for military actions. On September 26, 2022, three explosions were reported, resulting in the destruction of three out of the four pipelines connecting Russia with Germany. As a consequence, Nord Stream is no longer functioning, worsening Europe’s energy crisis.

In January 2022, a data cable that served Norway's Svalbard Satellite Station was mysteriously severed. France also encountered multiple occurrences of cable damage in 2022.

In August 2021, a Russian ship, called the Yantar, was seen hanging around near the Irish coast. This happened close to where a future cable, the Celtic Norse, will connect Ireland with Norway. It was also near another cable called AEConnect-1, which links Ireland with the United States.

But, apart from all this Russian activity that has been taking place, it is important to understand that everyone is actively trying to gain an advantage in this new area under the ocean. Military actions in Europe have systematically targeted seabed infrastructure, such as data and power cables, sensors and energy systems. If tensions rise in the region, there is no doubt that the seabed military actions happening in Europe could extend to the Indian Ocean.

The Indian Ocean carries submarine cables that link countries within the region and connect to distant places. Similar to how busy shipping routes pass through such key spots as the Malacca Strait and Bab el-Mandeb Strait, these cables, too, converge at these points, making them flashpoints for potential attacks. Submarine cables are underwater cables used to transmit data, including Internet and telecommunications signals, between different parts of the world. They lie on the seabed and connect various countries and continents to facilitate global communication and data transfer.

In the Indian Ocean, subsea pipelines will become more crucial, especially for India. India’s Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) already manages many kilometres of these pipelines off the western coast of India, linking such important oil fields as Mumbai High, Neelam, Heera and Bassein. Iran is contemplating expansion of its underwater natural gas pipeline, stretching it from Oman to India. This pipeline will link up with Porbandar in Gujarat. Additionally, there is a proposed $5-billion undersea gas pipeline project between the United Arab Emirates and India, which would also connect to Gujarat.

Australia already has a lot of gas pipelines on its North West Shelf in the Indian Ocean, linking offshore gas facilities to the mainland. However, as Australia focuses on building renewable energy structures, such as offshore wind and solar farms, wave energy installations and undersea connections along its coast, including in the Indian Ocean, it could face new risks related to seabed activities. Australia may even start transmitting solar power to Singapore using the world’s longest underwater high-voltage cable, called the Sub Cable Australia-Asia PowerLink.

Exploration for seabed mining is happening in the Indian Ocean, where there are plenty of polymetallic nodules. This type of mining will bring in new groups of people and different types of activities beneath the ocean’s surface. Polymetallic nodules are small, rock-like formations found on the ocean floor that contain valuable minerals, like metals such as nickel, copper and cobalt, making them valuable for potential mining operations.

Australia and India have numerous common interests when it comes to ensuring security in the Indian Ocean seabed. To address the challenges of seabed warfare, there is a need for open discussions and debates regarding its implications and how it fits into the defence strategies of both Australia and India. These discussions should cover such aspects as how to manage responses to seabed warfare, the equipment and technology needed (like ships, unmanned underwater vehicles, sensors and so forth) and how to establish the human resources and partnerships required. France has already shared its seabed warfare strategy in 2022, which could serve as a useful blueprint to follow.

The Indian Ocean is home to many coastal and island nations, but not all of them have advanced navies or coast guards. Unlike organizations like NATO, there is no central group to organize responses in the region. Given their strong naval and coast guard capabilities, Australia and India should take the lead in working with less-equipped nations in the area. They can collaborate with these countries to monitor seabed infrastructure, develop plans for dealing with disruptions and integrate seabed defence into their regular defence strategies. This cooperation can encompass various aspects, including improving awareness of the underwater domain, training programmes for seabed defence and incorporating seabed incident response scenarios into joint military exercises and drills in the region.

In May 2023, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) announced its intention to create a Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience, which, in simple terms, means capacity of cable infrastructure to continue functioning effectively even when faced with various disruptions or threats. Australia is set to launch an Indo-Pacific Cable Connectivity and Resilience Programme as part of this initiative. The United States has committed to offering capacity building and technical support through its ‘CABLES Program’, valued at US$5 million.

It is yet unclear whether this programme will solely focus on communication cables, or if it will encompass other forms of seabed infrastructure. These efforts should address the broader issue of seabed security, not limited to communication cables. While the Quad can be a platform for collaboration, Australia and India should lead the way in working with their Indian Ocean neighbours.

Both Australia and India should closely monitor developments related to seabed warfare in Europe, as they could serve as early indicators of potential challenges in our own region. As significant maritime powers in the Indian Ocean, these two nations should work together to ensure the security of critical seabed infrastructure. With increasing vital infrastructure crossing the Indian Ocean seabed, a coordinated effort is essential to safeguard these assets from potential disasters. (IPA Service)