For decades, Pakistan’s policy towards Afghanistan has been defined by strategic self-interest, particularly its pursuit of “strategic depth” against India. This approach saw Islamabad’s unwavering support for the Taliban during its rise to power, and again after its return in 2021. While designed to secure influence in Kabul, this strategy has backfired, creating chaos within Pakistan’s borders.

The Taliban’s resurgence has emboldened extremist groups like the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), resulting in a surge of terrorist attacks on Pakistani soil. In 2024 alone, over 2,500 deaths were recorded due to terrorism—a grim escalation (Financial Times). These attacks have not only destabilised Pakistan domestically but have strained its relations with regional powers, including China, which is increasingly concerned about its investments under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

For Bangladesh, Pakistan’s actions serve as a stark reminder of its short-term strategies that prioritise influence over regional stability. Aligning with Islamabad risks entangling Dhaka in Afghanistan’s enduring turmoil and undermining its own security.

Pakistan’s strategic partnership with China, epitomised by the $62 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), was heralded as a transformative economic initiative. Instead, it has plunged Pakistan deeper into debt. Burdened by unsustainable financial obligations, including payments for unused energy capacity, Pakistan now faces an economic crisis compounded by public unrest. The Wall Street Journal notes that these flawed agreements have crippled Islamabad’s ability to fund critical infrastructure, leaving its economy in shambles.

Compounding these economic woes are escalating security concerns. Attacks on Chinese workers in Pakistan, particularly in Balochistan, have strained bilateral ties. Beijing’s demands for enhanced security have further drained Pakistan’s resources, eroding the supposed benefits of the partnership.

For Bangladesh, which enjoys a growing and balanced partnership with China, aligning with Pakistan could expose it to similar economic pitfalls and security challenges emanating from Islamabad’s volatile regions.

Once a close ally during the Cold War and the War on Terror, Pakistan’s relationship with the United States has deteriorated dramatically. Its covert support for extremist groups and deepening ties with China have alienated Washington, leading to sanctions and reduced aid. In 2024, a senior U.S. official described Pakistan’s ballistic missile programme as an “emerging threat” (Reuters), highlighting the strategic mistrust.

For Bangladesh, this history highlights Islamabad’s inability to maintain stable, credible alliances. Partnering with Pakistan could jeopardise Dhaka’s growing ties with the U.S., a key global player.

Pakistan’s attempts to woo Bangladesh often carry the veneer of reconciliation, but they are undercut by its refusal to address historical injustices. Despite international recognition of the genocide during the 1971 Liberation War, Pakistan has neither apologised nor offered reparations. Its disregard for issues like the repatriation of stranded Biharis further underscores its insincerity.

These unresolved grievances cast doubt on Pakistan’s ability to engage with Bangladesh as an equal partner. Any alliance with Islamabad risks eroding Dhaka’s hard-earned sovereignty and reopening old wounds.

Pakistan’s economic instability, marked by recurring IMF bailouts, soaring inflation, and a weakening currency, makes it a risky partner. Its debt-to-GDP ratio is at unsustainable levels, reflecting chronic fiscal mismanagement. In contrast, Bangladesh’s steady economic growth has made it a rising star in South Asia. Tying itself to Pakistan could burden Dhaka with unnecessary financial liabilities.

Politically, Pakistan’s military-dominated governance and history of fostering extremist groups present additional risks. For Bangladesh, which has worked diligently to strengthen its democratic institutions, engaging with Islamabad could jeopardise its political stability and democratic progress.

Pakistan’s relationships with Afghanistan, China, and the United States reveal a consistent pattern of short-term opportunism, economic mismanagement, and diplomatic instability. In Afghanistan, its support for the Taliban has fuelled extremism. With China, its mishandling of CPEC investments has exacerbated its economic woes. And with the U.S., its strategic missteps have led to isolation.

These examples serve as critical lessons for Bangladesh. Pakistan’s alliances often prioritise its military ambitions at the expense of its partners’ interests. Strengthening ties with Islamabad risks making Dhaka another casualty of this history.

Rather than engaging with Pakistan, Bangladesh should focus on strengthening its partnerships with stable and supportive nations. Its growing ties with India, Japan, and China have bolstered its economy and enhanced its geopolitical standing. Aligning with Pakistan—a nation synonymous with instability—could jeopardise these achievements.

As Bangladesh continues its rise as a regional player, it must prioritise partnerships that align with its long-term interests. Pakistan’s troubled history and opportunistic strategies make it a perilous choice. Dhaka should learn from Pakistan’s alliances: they often bring more harm than good. (IPA Service)