There is nothing surprising about the newly elected Bangladesh government’s sudden decision to involve China in the project as a comprehensive water-sharing agreement on the Teesta has been stalled for over 15 years, largely due to opposition from the state of West Bengal, led by former Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee. Under the Indian Constitution, water is a state subject. The Centre cannot sign a binding Teesta water sharing agreement without West Bengal’s consent. Mamata Banerjee blocked the deal due to domestic water scarcity, ecological concerns, and political considerations. In September 2011, then-Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and the UPA government drafted an interim treaty proposing a water division during the dry season, giving India 42.5 percent and Bangladesh 37.5 percent. Mamata Banerjee, who was initially scheduled to accompany the Prime Minister to Dhaka, skipped the trip at the last minute and refused to sign the proposed deal.

Unable to secure a pact over the years, Bangladesh shifted focus to a conservation approach, inviting foreign infrastructure bids. The TRCMRP plans to build massive reservoirs, dredge the riverbed, build embankments, and construct satellite cities to mitigate dry-season water shortages and manage monsoon floods. Although New Delhi had already submitted its own technical and conservation proposal for the Teesta basin in a bid to resolve the issue collaboratively, the new Bangladesh government has opted for its own project under Chinese collaboration. New Delhi views China's prominent involvement in the basin as a strategic security concern near its borders. India has actively offered to fund and handle the conservation project to pre-empt Chinese influence but the new Bangladesh government decided to collaborate with China.

The Teesta issue has unfolded amid broader water diplomacy concerns, including the impending expiration of the 1996 India-Bangladesh Ganges Water Treaty. Bangladesh is pushing for urgent negotiations to establish a new Ganges water-sharing treaty with India, as the current 1996 pact expires in December. Leaders from the ruling Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) have formally linked the future of Dhaka's bilateral ties with New Delhi to a fair, climate-resilient water-sharing deal that meets Bangladesh's current needs. While the 30-year-old treaty established a structured mechanism for sharing dry-season flows at the Farakka Barrage, Bangladesh has frequently raised concerns that the actual water released during lean months often falls short of what was promised. On the contrary, India has maintained the issue of the release of Ganga water is addressed through established bilateral platforms, such as the ongoing joint measurements of water levels and engagement through the Joint Rivers Commission between the two countries.

While demanding renegotiations of the Ganges Water Treaty to govern the equitable sharing of dry-season water flows (January 1 to May 31) from the Ganga River between India and Bangladesh, the latter is believed to have approved a mega-project to construct a barrage on the Ganges water-fed Padma River. Bangladesh maintains this is for internal water management and mitigating dry-season salinity. The Ganga water treaty dictates water sharing at the Farakka Barrage in West Bengal based on 10-day cycles. If flows are under 70,000 cusecs, the water is divided equally (50:50). When water flows fall between 70,000 and 75,000 cusecs, Bangladesh is guaranteed 35,000 cusecs, with India receiving the remainder. For flows exceeding 75,000 cusecs, India retains 75,000 cusecs and Bangladesh receives the rest. If water levels drop below 50,000 cusecs, both governments must hold immediate emergency consultations to adjust the sharing.

Now, Bangladesh’s decision to involve China in the Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project has deeply alarmed India. New Delhi views Beijing's growing footprint close to the Siliguri Corridor as a critical strategic and security threat. The “Chicken’s Neck” is a 20-km wide and 60-km long chokepoint. It serves as India's only overland link connecting mainland India to its eight northeastern states. The northern Bangladesh project site where the river enters the country is situated less than 100 kms from this vital corridor. India strongly fears that a massive Chinese infrastructure presence in the basin —combined with other reported projects such as the Lalmonirhat airbase — could establish a permanent or semi-permanent Chinese diplomatic and logistical foothold right near India's most sensitive military and territorial chokepoint. India’s alarm is primarily driven by geography.

India must try to address Bangladesh’s river concerns as its three key sources of river water flow down from India through Brahmaputra, Ganga and Teesta. These rivers shrink considerably during the dry season. Every dry season, the water flow comes down. This is particularly more so in the case of Teesta River flowing through the Indian states of Sikkim and West Bengal before entering Bangladesh, where it is vital for agriculture and livelihoods. Hydro-politics has been a persistent source of tension between India and Bangladesh. The two countries must work together toward finalizing climate-resilient water-sharing agreements. With West Bengal now ruled by Bharatiya Janata Party, the national government should find it easier to address the river issues with Bangladesh. (IPA Service)