The most significant aspect of this model is a clear separation of the party establishment and the government managers. The Congress MPs vote with the government on final signals from the party establishment which itself avoids any active role in government's problems. For a ruling party, such a tight separation of the roles is something really amusing. Take the bitter battle of July 22, 2008. Even in the first week of July, the party was reluctant to snap ties with the Left. The MPs chosen to speak during the debate did defend the government's position. Yet the lack of commitment and involvement was writ large on their face.

Even while the debate was going on in the House, many party MPs grumbled about the wisdom of the government's rigid posture. On such occasions, any other political party might have launched a massive public campaign in support of the government. But the Congress party avoided it. The second trend has been the role of the non-political actors right from the stage of formulating government policies to drawing up the game plans to rope in groups like the Samajwadi Party. In 2008, some of those identified with the PM camp did try deal making. This time even that was missing.

Instead, the whole operation is carried out by non-political aides, mostly retired bureaucrats reappointed at crucial posts. Pranab Mukherjee's assistance is crucial both for pushing things ahead and earn the backing of the party establishment. However, this time final negotiations were left to 'in-house' talent Prithviraj Chavan, minister of state in PMO. Barring this, Congress MPs or ministerial colleagues had little involvement in mobilizing support. Some of them, in fact, feel they are kept out due to a trust deficit.

The Congress has a reservoir of tested leaders - many of them in cabinet - who have performed challenging tasks both within the party organisation and government under other PMs. The same ministers and leaders had grabbed initiatives under Rajiv Gandhi and Narasimha Rao. Under Vajpayee, those like Pramod Mahajan, Jaswant Singh, Arun Jaitley and Sushma Swaraj were ever ready to do public campaigns and trouble-shooting for the NDA government. Barring Vajpayee's old friend Brijesh Mishra, no non-political actors had worked in the shadows.

Then the third aspect. The real strength of the UPA dispensation has been the sustenance it derives from the powerful corporate and foreign lobbies. As early as 1997, L.K. Advani had emphasized the critical nature of such backup. Hereafter, he had told us in an informal chat, no government in India could survive without the protection of this twin-force. Those who dare to alienate them or refuse to look after their minimum interests will lose the job. This was Advani's main argument to jettison the Swadeshis within the RSS parivar and BJP who were then still holding out. Presence of the forces Advani had mentioned was overbearing in all the three confrontations the Manmohan Singh government had encountered.

The system we have perfected in India under the UPA can be a survival model for every government in functional democracies. The lobby power about which Obama bemoans is just one aspect of this well-orchestrated project. In its scope and reach, no politician, however ingenious he or she might be, could possibly conceive of and operationalise such an elaborate mission. One of the most successful experiments in public opinion building and producing legislative majority, it deserves a deeper study by experts. Comprehensive planning along with synchronised execution actions by different centres is the essence of its success.

Media as the main instrument, diplomats and statesmen, corporate honchos and the business associations and influential foreign players, and above all the government's enforcement agencies, play a crucial role in this sort of massive operation which calls for considerable democratic engineering. Such a mission alone could have achieved what the UPA did in the course of the 2008 standoff. Media facilitated the process by carefully dumping down or shutting off the adverse versions of the nuclear deal controversy. Reports, regular writers and opinion pages created a favourable ambience. Then experts, domestic and foreign, added to the public opinion buildup.

On the other side, the business lobbies began putting pressures on the vulnerable opposition groups. L.K. Advani, though shorn of much of the powers, had lent support to the India-US nuclear deal at least thrice - each time after meetings with US dignitaries or domestic corporates. And each time the party had publicly disowned his views. One can imagine the kind of arm twisting needed to get a person like Mulayam Singh Yadav to lent support to a move which he had consistently opposed. Later, the same tool was used to bring round the SP and RJD on the issue of cut motion.

On the liability bill, the same pattern was tried. Apart from the media push, corporate and foreign pressures were put on the BJP with full force. In-house writers and experts were mobilised. This time a rather novel idea was the orchestrated views of the PSUs and domestic firms telling the opposition that any 'burden' on suppliers will affect them as well. If all such lures failed, it was for two reasons. First, instead of the standing committee on power headed by a SP MP, the government handed the work to the one headed by a Congress MP. This trust deficit had angered Mulayam Singh Yadav. At the last minute the government found time was too short to win over the Yadavs using the same old stick.

Hence the early end of the monsoon session and the compulsions of passing the bill before the Obama visit in November forced the government to take to the next best option. It first agreed to the changes suggested by the BJP in the bill but tried to dilute it by stealth. An infuriated BJP insisted on the changes which had finally to be passed. Clearly, the US suppliers are not happy about the final product, which they fear, can be subjected to too many legal interpretations. Business circles fear that the new clause added on suppliers' liability will lead to a higher insurance 'burden' and end up in 'unnecessary complications'. Is PM's pat on the BJP for its cooperation too premature? Will he be forced to seek amendments to the bill to rectify the slips? These are the questions being asked. (IPA Service)