This is, however, conditional - and the condition is that India and China do not collide. India and China can - and should - be competitors, but they must not be adversaries. Competition and cooperation go hand in hand, but adversarial competition is another commodity.

As things stand, the good and the bad are amply visible in India-China relationship. Because of their anti-colonial legacy, strong nationalism, which sometimes manifests as narrow self-interest contradictory to the larger view, has become engrained in both China and India - with China, excessively. Thus, while pursuing their respective national goals, the two countries often find their positions colliding. Mature leadership on both sides has hitherto been able to loosen the knots and find the right half-way house. Their economic ties - the central challenge to both countries - have gone ahead in multidimensional terms, and trade has boomed - China is now India's largest trade partner overtaking the United States.

India-China cooperation can produce wonders for the two countries, no less for the world as a whole. But India-China collision can also prove disastrous. What is it that can pave the way for the first eventuality, and shut the door for the second?

It is this: The two countries must get past the India-China boundary dispute. This is one big step that can change everything. Solution of the India-China boundary dispute appears as a distant dream. But it might astonish many - solution of the boundary dispute is within grasp of the two countries: just a forward leap, a decisive step at the apex level by the two countries, and the border solution can be clinched and sealed.

The fact is that the solution has been proposed from the Chinese side on at least two occasions at the highest level, but the Indian side has not been prepared. By a twist of events, India has now largely come to accept this solution, but the Chinese leadership is in a halting frame of mind - probably weighing the best terms it can extract from India.

Let me recall the two occasions when a reasonable solution of the boundary dispute has been put forward by China's top leaders. I have been witness to the first occasion - a solution put forward by the veteran Chou En-lai, then China's prime minister, in 1961 during his last visit to India. It was a press conference at Rashtrapati Bhawan on the eve of his departure from India, that lasted for over four hours, and ended only past mid-night when the BBC correspondent fervently requested an end, so that “we might not lose the story”.

It was a lucid and comprehensive solution that the Chinese leader then proposed. This, in substance, is what Chou En-lai put forward as a solution to the border dispute.

(a) The India-China boundary can be divided into three sectors : the middle sector where the dispute is minimal and the areas in dispute can be easily negotiated; the eastern and western sectors where the claimed areas by both sides are large and the crux of efforts to solve the dispute have to concentrate. (b) In the eastern sector, India projects the border line along what it terms the McMahon Line. While China does not recognize the McMahon Line since it was an imperialist imposition, China is willing to give up its claims on the areas India is occupying here, largely following the natural high ridges. On the western sector, China seeks India's acceptance of the line of demarcation along what India calls Aksai-chin. (c) This is a reasonable solution of overlapping claims in which historical legacy is entirely on China's side; Indian nomenclature itself speaks out - Aksai Chin : the rock of China.

In 1980, again, it was the Chinese leader Deng Hsiaoping, who ushered in China's economic reforms, proposed a solution similar to Chou Enlai's offer - giving the areas south of the McMahon Line to India and Aksai Chin to China.

But India was not in a frame of mind to accept the Aksai Chin area as Chinese. There was a change in thinking subsequently, when intensive research by a former Defence Ministry expert, Mr John Lal, largely substantiated Chou Enlai's contentions in a well-researched book on Aksai Chin. While Mr Lal's research found Chinese claims to be loose, since there had never been continuous Chinese hold on the entire territory of Aksai Chin, Indian claim on the territory had no credible base to rest upon.

Mr Lal, in fact, termed the Chou Enlai solution as the best that India has been offered hitherto. The 1962 border war changed the perspective to an extent. But during the Rajiv Gandhi visit to China, negotiations on the border solution were set on the right lines, and later, the Narasimha Rao Beijing visit resulted in a frame-work - principles on which the solution must rest.

Substantial work has been done by both sides to solve the India-China border issues. Even after the broad principles were accepted, differences on comparatively small areas are sizeable and intricate. At times the Chinese side has been seized with the thinking that a stable and strong government in India had to negotiate the settlement as a single package deal. Till such time, the Chinese side preferred to keep their original claims on Arunachal intact. Lately, misgivings have increased on the Indian side because of repeated assertions from Beijing on their claim on Arunachal, and border intrusions have grown.

It has become clear that only a package deal - not only pertaining to broad acceptance of the McMahon Line 'highest ridge' and Aksai Chin as the eastern and western sector borders but also several small territorial pockets - has to be negotiated as one whole. And this can be done only at the highest level. The ground work has nevertheless to be prepared by the two sides, and the ball has been set rolling at the 13th round of border talks between the two designated strategic representatives.

It is clear however that the final solution has to be clinched only by the political leadership. The Indian side is better prepared now for the settlement but there is haziness on the finality. It is essential that there should be consensus in India on the final specific terms. The Chinese side too has to forgo small territorial claims, such as the recent stipulation on Tawang, which goes against the accepted principle of not disturbing populated areas.

A liberal frame of mind will pay both countries since concessions given on small outlandish patches of land in the high mountains to clinch the border solution will unleash far greater bonanza for both countries - goodwill, prosperity and greatness that runs through the decades ahead in the 21st century. Since the Chinese side has larger options, it also has greater obligations, which if put into operation will produce greater boons to that country. (IPA Service)