Whatever Pakistan may say about the situation in Jammu and Kashmir, its record in Balochistan is worse. The Pakistan Army is trying to crush the uprising ruthlessly and there has been gross violation of human rights. Some compare the situation in Balochistan to J&K but there is a difference. People, by and large, support India and no one, except a small section, led by hardliners want to go with Pakistan. They want “azadi” which is not possible in the given situation.

One wonders why with all its internal unrest and a revolt brewing in Balochistan, Pakistan should send militants across the borders in Kashmir to foment trouble and be killed. Also Indian soldiers are killed in clashes. It is clear that Pakistan government is not fully in control of the situation. India must distinguish between the Pakistani military and its political leadership.

Nawaz Sharif is in danger of being undercut by his own army. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Raiwind visit was followed by Pathakot attack. Just as Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s Lahore bus journey was followed by Kargil invasion. India’s inability to distinguish between Sharif’s friendly feeling and the Pakistan Army’s more complicated games persuaded Sharif to appease the army at home.

The gruesome death of 18 jawans in Uri is arguably a defining moment for Modi’s foreign policy. But India’s larger enduring strategic puzzle remains the same. How do you deal with a nuclear state that uses terror as an instrument and which is still back-rolled by major powers? How do you deal with a state where the army has incentive to maintain centrality, whose identity is marked by resentment? There are no easy or comfortable answers.

Remember, Pakistan is a state where defeat leads to even more militarization and radicalization; this is a state that is willing to bear the cost of great internal violence, so a little more experience of internal violence will hardly dent it. It makes reasonably assumption about the risk of escalation.

The stakes are too high to ignore this risk. It makes reasonable assumption about the Indian state’s capabilities. It also draws on recent historical experience; societies are not weakened just by terrorism and as much as they are by overreactions. Under some circumstances, restrain can be a form of deterrence, since the other side does not get political leverage it hoped for.
It is also based on the recognition that India-Pakistan dispute is not a conventional problem; it is a long psychological and historical process. Restraint also plays to India’s advantage; India’s strength and standing have increased immeasurably during the last decade or so.

We should have expected an escalation of violence from Pakistan. After 1971, instead of crafting a new, perhaps more liberal political identity, it used violence and Islam more as a plank of statecraft. This is not a question of blame. But it is elementary political logic that you raise the ante with another symbolism existential threat in Balochistan, there will be blowback from a state that has no compunctions of any kind.

Second, the military-civilian tussle is still a live issue in Pakistan and keeping the India pot boiling has always been a central element to it. Third, Pakistan’s strategy of “internationalization” has always rested on creating a sense of apocalyptic violence in South Asia. It operates on the assumption that bad behavior that can be shown to destabilize the region will get the world’s attention. Therefore, India’s restrained response has it chafing. Fourth, arguably uncertainty in the US is tempting many powers to be adventurous. Finally, there is the immediate context of Kashmir.

Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s address to UN General Assembly was lackluster. He, as usual, raked up Kashmir issue and glorified slain Hizbul Commander Burhan Wani as a young leader even as he expressed readiness for a “serious and sustained dialogue” with India for peaceful resolution of outstanding disputes, especially Jammu and Kashmir.

Sharif’s remarks drew a sharp reaction from India. “glorification of Wani shows continued Pakistan attachment to terrorism”. Also, Sharif poses unacceptable conditions to a dialogue. India’s only condition is an end to terrorism, said Vikas Swarup, spokesman of the External Affairs Ministry.

In a fresh development, two American law makers introduce a bill in the US Congress that aims to designate Pakistan a state sponsor of terror that is a terrorist state. It is a humiliation to Pakistan. The US move to declare Pakistan a terrorist state came ahead of Sharif’s address to UN General Assembly. (IPA Service)