This is the most crucial lesson for the UPA. The decision had bared the UPA's disorderly working arrangement and the gaping disconnect between the government and the party establishment.
Every one knows that the popular mandate as expressed in this year's Lok Sabha elections was not in favour of a separate Telangana state. If it were so, the Telangana Rashtra Samiti which went to the polls on the separate state issue, would not have ended up with just 10 out of 117 seats it had contested. How then was the UPA government suddenly frightened into making a midnight proclamation? An insider account provides startling details of the haphazard way of rushing with crucial decisions. The TRS chief was on fast for ten days, and the Congress MPs and leaders from the state have been pressing for quick action before things went out of control.
But the party chief's aides directed them to PM, and the latter to Chidambaram. It is not that the Andhra leaders had no solution. There are many ways to deal with a fast-unto-death, including clinical solutions. And different kinds of dilatory methods were available even at that stage. TRS has always been prone to lures. Andhra Congress leaders were mentioning many such proposals. But the whole thing got delayed in the UPA government's 'jurisdiction' muddle. The leadership woke up to the situation only on December 9 when there was a sudden panic caused by reports of the fasting leader's worsening condition.
'Core' committee members present in Delhi met twice to hear the grim situation from Chidambaram. The Chief Minister was summoned but the whole consultation was confined to the 'core' group. At the second 'core' meeting, Chidambaram reported that Rao's condition was critical and field reports said if the worst happened, the law and order situation will be uncontrollable. After his presentation, Congress stalwarts sought an overnight capitulation. The panic was such that there was no time to consider any other structured solution or waiting to announce it in Parliament which was in session.
Even the Union Cabinet was ignored. UPA allies were kept in dark. That was the kind of tearing hurry the leadership betrayed after a week-long inaction when tension was building up. Old timers like M.L. Fotedar will tell you how Indira Gandhi had dealt with more challenging situations. She had relied on an elaborate multi-level consultation system which included government agencies, bureaucrats, party leaders, individuals and even trusted scribes. Informal channels were used to bring round even those like Vinoba Bhave. NDA had a talented set of operators - George Fernandes, Jaswant Singh, Pramod Mahajan, Jaitley and Sushma, all ever ready to do the trouble-shooting whether it was Badal, Mayawati, Mamata or Jayalalithaa.
UPA never had any such ideas. Instead, Arjun Singhs and Mani Shankar Aiyars were condemned as detractors. Lack of a combined leadership, sole reliance on the same wise six men on all issues, compartmentalised decision-making, last-minute haste and disrespect for established institutions are UPA establishment's bane. True, much of this has been a historic hangover. Due to repeated 'weak-PM' taunts, the whole effort was to make the PM and his government look like a water-tight establishment cut off from the political wing. To strengthen the PM's hands, the party chief had consciously discouraged meeting ministers. In our kind of set-up under a rainbow coalition, such artificial division of job - all government policies to PM and political issues to party chief - can be potentially disastrous.
If these inherent weaknesses did not show up under UPA1, it was mainly due to the constant vigil by the outside supporter. This had made it look like a PM-Left tussle during most of UPA1 with Sonia Gandhi acting as an occasional peace-maker. Thus there was little scope for the party-government schism to surface. True, the Sonia establishment is now more proactive. The party now does not hesitate to air its disapproval on issues like India-Pakistan statement and price.
In a situation where the PM and party boss are different entities, things can work only under a combined leadership system. This is more so when the cabinet itself functions more as separate compartments under redoubtable personalities like Pranab Mukherjee, A.K. Antony and Chidambaram. The present 'core' group is a poor substitute for a meaningful system of combined leadership. The nearest to this may be the Indira-era joint meetings of CPB (central parliamentary board) and CCPA (cabinet committee on political affairs). Both had over a dozen experienced leaders from the two wings.
Unlike the combined CCPA-CPB oversight, the 'core' group is essentially a crisis resolution body, originally set up to sort out issues raised by the Left. It has some eminent leaders as members but they act as individuals, more as proactive jurists and moderators. What the UPA needs is a structured mechanism in which top leaders of the party and government should oversee the entire gamut of policies involving the party and government. Purists may call it as an encroachment on cabinet's prerogatives or obliterating the line between party and government. But that is purely a technical objection which all regimes, including the NDA, had overlooked.
Seven months into its second term, the UPA faces serious challenges ahead. Suddenly, the government is showing all signs of losing direction. The two-year-old Ranganath Mishra report is going to be the next headache. Why did the PM offer to open this Pandora' box now? Mishra's recommendations include reservations for Dalit and OBC converts from within the existing quota. It is bound to spark another political turmoil with sharp reaction from diverse caste and religious groups.
On other fronts, things are rapidly going out of control. The aam aadmi, who had blessed the UPA twice, is apparently disillusioned with the government. Middle classes are the worst sufferers of a 20 per cent increase in food prices. The Congress Working Committee had twice warned the Government against its lethargy on price front. Instead of resorting to occasional firefighting, it is time for the Congress establishment to assert itself to set things right. A well structured party-government coordination mechanism alone can ward off frequent administrative hara-kiri. (IPA Service)
New Delhi Letter
UPA GOVERNMENT LOSING STEAM
PANIC REACTIONS WON'T DO
Political Correspondent - 2009-12-19 11:30
The general perception about the UPA's Telangana misadventure has been that it was just one false step by the otherwise well-run government. But a closer look will show that the panic decision on December 9 should also serve as a warning shot about the way this government takes important decisions.