Two facets stand out in Pakistan today. Assertion of Pakistani civil society against Talibanism is a new feature of Pakistan worthy of being uplifted. This is the first real war between the Islamic extremists and the army - in the Swat valley the army has delivered. There are connotations here for Pakistan's future relations with India.

Pakistan is no longer a monolith - a divided nation in which bulk of civil society is ranged against Islamic extremists whose gun is poised at Islamabad no less than India. The three As - Allah, America and Army - are no longer the arbiters of Pakistan's fate. The Army has been greatly weakened and is now dependent largely on American largesse. On the other hand, bulk of the Pakistanis (of all hues) are no longer enamoured of America; in fact they detest the United States. Only a tiny section looks up to the United States - and that for the financial aid bounty.

Second, the deteriorating economy, which no amount of dole from America can salvage, also has a deep linkage with Indo-Pak ties. More than dole from America it is ties with India - economic and cultural - that can transform this failed state into a viable entity.

At another level, one should also recognise a third ingredient - Balochistan. Here, an ethnic implosion stares Pakistan in the face. Alongside is a gradually welling insurrectionary mood in parts of Pak occupied Kashmir - the Northern Areas, Gilgit and Baltistan. No amount of allusions to the 'Indian hand' can wish away the grim reality of a simmering ethnic revolt in these vast regions too.

This backdrop should be enough to impel a fresh overview of Indo-Pakistani ties, and the need to forge new parameters of Indian diplomacy vis-à-vis Pakistan. These parameters should shake off rigid concepts of the past. India's security and fighting the jihadi terrorists poised against India - the Mumbai assault is the apex - of course remains the first priority. But it should find a linkage with Pakistani society's own war against terrorism and Islamic extremism - Talibanism - and its strivings for economic salvation.

Such being the setting, it is amazing that the Sharm el-Sheikh statement of the two Prime Ministers that carries a conditional opening of dialogue, and possibility of serious Indo-Pak negotiations, has greatly upset the principal Opposition parties. It appears as if the Opposition parties - possibly some in the Congress also - are apprehensive of the very word dialogue. Why?

Is it because such dialogue and possibility of meaningful Indo-Pak negotiations will hamper the fight against Pak-based terrorism? Unlikely: because even if one accepts the Jilani version of the statement, it is clear - as Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has pointed out - such negotiations cannot progress unless the Pakistan government acts on its promise against the anti-Indian jihadis. So, if the Pakistani side is really keen on negotiations with India, as it appears to be, they will not spoil the prospects by actually de-linking action against terrorism and what is called a 'composite dialogue'.

It appears that the spurt against the Egypt statement is primarily goaded by fear of the very word 'negotiations'. What has India to fear from? Negotiations, it is apprehended, will enable Pakistan to escape the impending doom and run away with concessions. This indeed is a perverted view that could damage India's own dynamic growth. There is also the apprehension that opening a fresh round of negotiations with the Pak establishment will open the window of American intervention because of America's keen desire for an end to the Kashmir issue.

This is a thoroughly negative and defeatist stance. In reverse, one might say, negotiations are best conducted from a position of strength, which is the Indian reality of today. India's leverage in relation to Pakistan has never been stronger. The need of the hour is to forge new parameters of diplomacy and negotiations with Pakistan that match today's situation - parameters that have an outreach to the good elements as against the bad elements in Pakistan.

New Delhi can and should develop levers to reach out to Pakistani civil society and to its political components that stand for healthy Indo-Pak interaction and ties. In other words, moulding the conflict within Pakistan for the better, reinforcing the fight against Talibanism, and enhanced economic and cultural interaction, is part of the perspective.

Where does Balochistan fit in? The outcry against the reference to unrest in Balochistan being aided by India is flimsy. The fact is that mention of Balochistan has the potential of internationalising an ethnic revolt. Damaging for Pakistan, for the Balochi ethnic revolt is not an Indian creation but the result of Islamabad's neo-colonialism - next only to the Bangladesh revolt in its intensity and potential damage for Pakistan.

The reference to Balochistan pressed into the Prime Ministers' joint statement could well have been a Manmohan trick to beguile the Pak government into a slippery position. Except that we do not expect the genial Indian Prime Minister to be capable of beguiling Jilani, who is so keen to register a win where Zardari had failed. But in effect this is what has come about - for the Pakistan side is unwittingly bringing its Balochistan ethnic revolt to world view. By alluding to an 'Indian hand' the ethnic revolt stemming from neo-colonialism imposed on the Balochis cannot be wished away. It can only come into the world's glare. That brings grist to the Baloch ethnic revolt - the worst that Pakistan faces, having parallels with emergence of Bangladesh. The outcry of the Opposition parties is therefore totally misplaced.

The Prime Minister's statement in Parliament, 'Trust but Verify' and 'Verify before Action' - the importance of engagement and dialogue, while insisting on Pakistan keeping its promise of action against the anti-India Lashkar terrorists - carries the stamp of statesmanship. It is ironic and tragic that as in his other great acts, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has not received the kind of recognition that he deserved.

In this backdrop, one might venture to explore the meaning of the Pakistani quest for “composite dialogue”, and what India should be looking for. If and when such a dialogue is launched, the points of accord reached in earlier subverted negotiations should be resurrected and given a final push. The Pakistan side is keen on pushing trade and economic assistance from India but seeks an alibi - resolving the Kashmir issue and a few other vexed disputes such as Sir Creek, Siachen and water sharing. Weakened from within, it is banking on American help though it is not overtly stating as much, for good reason.

Engagement and dialogue with Pakistan are essential from India's point of view also. With a hefty economic leverage, India should take a lesson or two from the way China is using its vast economic strength to build economic vantage points. As for Kashmir, the situation is favourable to India, for this country alone can offer full democracy, autonomy, economic and cultural largesse in meeting the Kashmiri aspirations. We need not worry about America's role. Gone are the Cold War Twenties. In the 21st century, American role can only be helpful to India - or to Indo-Pak bonhomie. (IPA Service)