Widely held is the perception that the NPT, and even the CTBT, is a threat to this country's de facto nuclear weapon power status. The fact is that renewal of global interest in the NPT and the CTBT is a fresh opportunity for India to redress a wrong and for winning back its rightful place as a weapon power within the NPT structure, in order to give a momentum to global nuclear disarmament. And in this aim, the CTBT fits in neatly.

There is a forgotten history of the NPT worth recalling. The NPT was launched on the plea of freeing the world from the nightmare of nuclear weapons - as a nuclear weapons non-proliferation organization that curbed the spread of nuclear weapons. Not only horizontal but equally, vertical proliferation. These objectives are enshrined in the NPT preamble, in the shaping of which India contributed a great deal. The operative structure of the NPT, however, contains little that makes it binding on the weapon states to curb their nuclear arsenals. India's plea for such a binding insertion in the NPT text was deliberately not accepted by the NPT promoters - primarily the United States, aided by Britain and the erstwhile Soviet Union.

The preamble is thus no more than an illusion to lure the non-weapon states into permanent inferior nuclear status so as to perpetuate Big Power nuclear hegemony with the help of the NPT. The upshot: the NPT has belied its promise and instead, has become a major proliferation agent - vertical proliferation at first, allowing the big powers a free run in the nuclear weapons arms race.

The cold war years witnessed a frightening build up of nuclear arsenals by the two Super Powers, the USA and the erstwhile Soviet Union, to the extent that the two - or either of them - could destroy entire world civilization twice or three times over. This realization pulled the two Super Powers back from the brink, resulting in rewinding of the cold war.

But the damage had been done. The real face of the NPT was revealed: And states desired to free themselves from the Big Powers nuclear straitjacket.

States like Libya that unsuccessfully sought to build nuclear weapons were termed 'rogue' states by the United States. So was North. Korea, who not only pulled out from the NPT but defied the Big Powers by openly building nuclear weapon devices. India had special relevance for the NPT, for this country alone - among the non-weapon States - had acquired nuclear weapon capability when the NPT was formed.

The question has been posed: was India cheated of its right to a weapon status in the NPT structure by virtue of its acquisition of weapon capability well before the 1969 deadline? The answer is in the affirmative.

Indian nuclear scientists assert that BARC, the premier Indian R&D centre, was delivering weapon-grade plutonium 239 from 1964 onwards - five years before the NPT proclaimed Lakshman Rekha. And this weapon grade plutonium was tested in 1974 and found perfect. True, India did not go in for a nuclear test by the NPT deadline. Instead, India used its plutonium capability for peaceful purposes. The NPT, with its declared purpose of curbing nuclear weapons, should not have had a problem in this regard. The criteria for NPT should be nuclear capability, including weapon capability, and not the explosions - for which India had ample know-how, as was shown, first in 1974 and later in 1998. But the United States was bent on bringing India in the NPT with a non-weapon status, for obvious reasons,

Consequently, India refused to join the NPT because it was a discriminatory treaty, debarring the bulk of the nations from testing nuclear weapons while giving a free run to the five declared nuclear weapon states. Also, because it barred India from nuclear tests, if and when it considered it necessary to do so for its national security. For twenty years India successfully fought a tug of war with the United States on this issue and has now emerged a victor.

That phase is over, with the United States recognition of India's advanced nuclear capability built indigenously, and urging the Nuclear Suppliers' Group to allow India international nuclear commerce and interaction, even while it retained its nuclear arsenal. By virtue of entering a “separation” clause which allowed India a free hand in retaining and building its nuclear arsenal, the Indo-US nuclear accord accepts India's international nuclear commercial and scientific interaction - keeping the imported nuclear material and technology for peaceful uses, under IAEA safeguards.

It is therefore time to re-examine India's status vis-à-vis the NPT. If India joins the NPT, it would be as a weapon state. It would be in the interest of the NPT to restructure its relevant clauses to accept India as a weapon state member. If India joins the NPT as a member with weapon status, it could use its standing to propel the NPT for complete non-proliferation - not only horizontal but even more vertical - aiming at total nuclear disarmament. The forthcoming NPT review conference should be an occasion to bring about these changes in the interest of ending the nightmare of nuclear weapons.

Where does the CTBT fit in? After having failed to hook India for the NPT, the United States conceived of another stratagem for the same purpose, namely, to draw India in its 'non-proliferation' plans through the CTBT, thus debarring an Indian nuclear test. That is why India vetoed the CTBT at the Geneva disarmament conference. Subsequently, the United States virtually blocked the CTBT by refusing Congressional ratification. China too followed, by refusing to ratify the CTBT till the American Congress ratifies it.

Now we are being assured by President Obama that he will pressurize the American Congress to ratify the CTBT. If and when this transpires - and ensures a full global endorsement of the CTBT - a new situation would arise, as Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has said. Having built a nuclear deterrent for its security concerns, it would be in India's interest to join the CTBT, and become a leader of global nuclear disarmament. While retaining and strengthening its nuclear deterrent, Indian objective henceforth should be to side by side campaign for global nuclear disarmament. CTBT, in such an eventuality, can be acceptable to India.

This may not be to the liking of our hydrogen bomb nuclear fundamentalists, arduously campaigning for more nuclear tests to further add to Indian nuclear lethal capability by perfecting a super hydrogen bomb. That is not Indian thinking and strategy, which has from inception aimed at global nuclear disarmament, hitherto not acceptable to the Big Powers. If the CTBT comes giving parity to all nations, India should welcome it. (IPA Service)