A motive existed. The Morales government was vulnerable. And resources—read agents—were in place.

Bolivia’s socialist government had achieved successes and so represented the threat of a good example. Over many years, that’s been a motivating factor for other U.S. interventions. More immediately, Bolivia was bucking colonial or imperialist requirements that a dependent nation may not hold back on the delivery of wealth taken from nature. At issue this time was lithium, not the silver, tin, oil, or natural gas Bolivia has previously exported.

Bolivia’s lithium deposits amount to as much as 70% of the world’s total. Lithium is essential to the manufacture of electronic devices, computers, smart phones, and especially batteries—think electric cars. European and Canadian corporations tried but were unable to gain access.

The Morales government had required at least 50% control of foreign extraction projects; proceeds went toward social development. As regards lithium, foreign companies would have partnered with one of the two state-owned Bolivian companies. Eventually, contracts broke down or never came to fruition.

Recently, two Chinese companies were on the verge of signing contracts with the Bolivian government. China produces almost two-thirds of the world’s lithium batteries and, according to Reuters, “controls most of the world’s lithium processing facilities.” The U.S. government faced the prospect of China gaining exclusive access to Bolivia’s lithium.

Incentive, however, is not enough. U.S. interventions require favorable conditions on the ground. The setting in Bolivia must have looked encouraging to U.S. officials. They had allies. These are the European-descended, relatively wealthy Bolivians who, biased against the poor and the indigenous, have mobilized frequently and often violently against Bolivia’s first indigenous president. The so-called “civic committees” in Bolivia’s four eastern departments have provided leadership. That’s where Bolivia’s production of oil, natural gas, and soy is concentrated, along with its wealth.

U.S. Embassy officials had conspired with the civic committees. The committees had enabled racist assaults and mayhem and had encouraged a separatist movement and an assassination attempt against Morales. The government ultimately expelled the U.S. ambassador, Drug Enforcement Agency, and the U.S. Agency for International Development. When the time came for a coup, Bolivia’s opposition was ready and prepared.

Controversy over another presidential term for Morales had raged prior to the eventual elections. The resulting divisions and tension must have gratified U.S. coup planners. At issue was a constitutionally imposed two-term limit. The Morales forces suffered a narrow defeat in a Feb. 2016 referendum vote on ending the ban. Later on, the Constitutional Court repealed the limit imposed by the Constitution. That opened the door to another term for Morales.

Most of the judges belonged to Morales’s political party. Agitation over the legality of another term fed into an already unsettled atmosphere; the government looked to be vulnerable. Adding to the mix were allegations of government corruption and dissent over intrusive infrastructure projects.

Morales and Vice President García Linare gained 47% of the vote on Oct. 20 and scored a victory. Their 10.6% plurality over the next candidate in line exceeded the constitutional threshold for a first round victory. Now attention would turn to rapidly escalating protests and violence. Bands of thugs sponsored by the civic committees were on a rampage. Now was time for the U.S. government to move in for the kill. Preparations had been made.

On the day of the elections, the Organization of American States (OAS), commenting on the government’s preliminary report on the voting, highlighted irregularities. The United States echoed those concerns. Protests accentuated and, on Oct. 24, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal officially announced the election results. Under pressure, the government asked the OAS to validate the outcome. Responding on Nov. 10, earlier than expected, the OAS reiterated the story of irregularities. New elections were recommended, and a new Supreme Electoral Tribunal. Morales convoked another election—just before he resigned.

The idea of electoral fraud or significant irregularities was false. Having looked at the statistics, Walter Mebane and colleagues at the University of Michigan concluded that “fraudulent votes in the election were not decisive for the result.” The Washington-based Center for Economic and Policy Research performed another detailed study and reached the same conclusion.

The OAS, headquartered in Washington, fulfilled expectations as U.S. government handmaiden. The OAS took shape under U.S. auspices in 1948 with the assigned task of protecting Latin America and the Caribbean against communist infection. More recently, the OAS, under Secretary General Luis Almagro’s guidance, has spearheaded U.S. efforts to expel President Nicolás Maduro’s progressive Venezuelan government.

Paradoxically, Almagro in May 2019 gave Morales the go-ahead for a fourth presidential term. That was despite the defeat of the referendum that would have allowed the extra term. His intention may have been to lull Morales into cooperating with an OAS overview of the election results. In any case, the OAS proved to be a “good and faithful servant.”

Conclusions are in order. First, a coup did take place in Bolivia, and the U.S. government had a big role in planning and facilitating it. The coup in Bolivia thus joins a long list of U.S. coups aimed at stabilizing the capitalist world order. This one took some doing, sort of like those in Guatemala (1954) and Chile (1973).

Beyond that, recent events in Bolivia serve as a reminder that to use elections alone to reach socialism or get rid of capitalism is problematic. The Bolivia experience shows that the police and military forces somehow have to be dealt with. (People’s World — IPA Service)