Markey believes that the Pakistan army and the ISI “continue to call the shots on foreign and defence policies” with the result that their “harder line” is followed by the “civilian authorities from foreign secretary to prime minister to president”.

None of this is surprising since the disjunction between what Pakistan does and says is becoming increasingly obvious. The earlier evidence of the gulf between word and deed was ascribed to insincerity, as in the case of Pervez Musharraf, whose promise to contain terrorism proved to be hollow. In the present instance, the civilians were initially perceived to be less inclined to turn a blind eye to acts of terrorism directed against India. They were also more honest, as could be seen from President Asif Ali Zardari's comment that India did not pose a threat.

But that period of friendliness turned out to be short-lived. The first sign that it was not Zardari but the army chief, Ashfaq Kayani, who was really in charge was available when the latter overturned the President's offer to send the ISI chief to India following the Mumbai massacres. After that, Zardari has been sliding steadily downhill as Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani has taken more and more powers in his hands. He and the Foreign Minister, Mehmood Shah Qureshi, are clearly more hawkish, an attitude which was also displayed by Bashir in Delhi.

But even if they were more inclined to ease the tension between the two countries, it is unlikely that the army and the ISI would have let them chart a course for peace. As the rise in infiltration into Kashmir, the functioning of terror camps - 42 of them, according to Defence Minister A. K. Antony - and the rabid jingoism of Hafiz Saeed show, there are powerful forces in Pakistan which are determined to scuttle the peace process.

Their first successful salvo to attain this sinister objective was the attack on Mumbai. Before that, the mutual negotiations and the various sporting and cultural exchanges were creating a conducive atmosphere despite the occasional bomb blasts at crowded places. However, since these outrages were unable to stop the dialogue, the deadly attacks of 26/11 were undertaken.

But although the patrons of terror have succeeded in stalling the peace talks, there is clearly a sense of uncertainty in Pakistan about the next step. While the military is probably pushing the civilian authorities to insist on a composite dialogue in the hope of diluting the focus on terrorism and bringing Kashmir to the forefront, the Indian refusal to budge has placed Islamabad in a dilemma. Bashir's presentation of data on the terrorist attacks inside Pakistan was meant to revive the old argument about both India and Pakistan being victims of terrorism.

But this equation has begun to sound unconvincing for two reasons. One is that Pakistan is simply unable to control the Frankenstein's monster which it has created and, therefore, does not deserve as much sympathy as India. Saudi Arabia's call to Islamabad to check extremism underlines this point. The other reason is the suspicion that the Pakistan army is unwilling to control groups like the LeT/Jamaat-ud-Dawa, HuJI, the Haqqani faction, etc. because it regards them as a part of its strategic arsenal against India.

It is the realisation in Pakistan that its protestations of innocence about the patronising of terrorists are no longer believed which has made it jittery. The army, for one, is not sure about India's reaction if there is another major terrorist attack like 26/11, especially when several American diplomats have told them that the world will understand if India retaliates with military force.

Hence, the observation by Markey that there is “palpable fear” in Pakistan about an Indian response, which can be “very, very dangerous for Pakistan”. An earlier calculation by the Pakistan army was that a heightened tension with India would give it an excuse not to move its troops from the Indian border and thereby provide some reprieve to the terrorists in the north-west. But now it is not very sure how long it can sustain a warlike atmosphere without risking severe strictures from America.

At the same time, a lasting peace with India is the last thing on the Pakistan army's agenda since it will amount to, at least in its mind, a virtual defeat since India will not only retain but even enhance its numero uno position in the subcontinent. Not only will India keep Kashmir, but its greater military and economic strength, as also huge “soft” power, will pave the way for it to become a major regional power.

Pakistan, on the other hand, will remain saddled with its terrorist groups, which will turn on it with renewed vigour for having frustrated their plans for jehad against India, Israel and the West. (IPA Service)