Whereas even in authoritarian and theocratic countries such as Egypt, Iran or North Korea, the army remains under the control of a civilian leadership, which determines the country's relations with the outside world, it isn't the case in Pakistan.

Even when the country is ostensibly a democracy, as at present, there is little doubt that the President or the Prime Minister does not always call the shots. As much was evident when Asif Ali Zardari's well-intentioned offer to send the ISI chief to India after 26/11 was overruled by Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kayani.

The reason why the Pakistan army has taken on itself a dominating role is the conviction that it remains virtually the sole guardian of the country's Islamic identity. It probably regards this onerous responsibility with considerable seriousness because Pakistan is supposed to be the homeland of Muslims of the entire sub-continent.

The army's self-image must have been enhanced all the more by the long years of American encouragement during the Cold War when Washington seemingly preferred a military dictatorship in Islamabad as opposed to rule by squabbling politicians.

In addition, the Pakistan army clearly believes that it cannot let down its guard because India has apparently never been reconciled to Pakistan's existence. As such, it constantly poses a threat to Pakistan both militarily and culturally.

If the Pakistan army had only been concerned with safeguarding the country's integrity, there might not have been any problems between the two neighbours. But, the difficulty is that apart from preserving Pakistan's sovereignty, the army is seemingly intent on extending Islamic rule to re-establish the kind of Muslim hegemony in India, as in the centuries prior to the arrival of the British.

Kashmir has evidently been the focal point of this quest from the time of the 1948 “tribal” invasion to Gen. Pervez Musharraf's Kargil misadventure in 1999. The Pakistan army's urge to grab the state became more intense following its defeat in Bangladesh. After that, its overt and covert operations in Kashmir were acts of revenge for the humiliation of 1971.

In recent years, however, the army and the ISI have left it to the jehadis to do their work for them. It was the success of the war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan which encouraged a dependence on Islamic militants to achieve Pakistan's diplomatic objectives.

The Soviet Union's defeat was a seminal event. Not only did it provide in Afghanistan a huge area where the fanatics could hone their military skills and be brainwashed into becoming suicide bombers, the victory over a superpower (albeit with the help of another) convinced the Pakistan army that it could also bring India down to its knees.

What is curious is that it still seems to believe in the same fiction. Although Afghanistan no longer provides the Pakistan army with a place of strategic retreat in case of a war with India, it apparently still hopes that the Taliban - or, at least, the Afghan component of the outfit - will act as a strategic reserve.

For the same reason, the Al Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban, too, are not regarded by the army as enemies, but as friends against the bigger enemy of India. Hence, the reluctance to launch major military operations in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the North-West Frontier Province.

Even, now, it is only under American pressure that the army has started an offensive in the Buner area. But its heart is not in it. The army and the ISI still hope that if the peace deal with the militants in Swat holds, then it can call off its operations and keep its guns pointed at India.

Strangely, it isn't only the army which believes that India poses the greater danger. Even sections of the middle class do not seem to be convinced that the Taliban is a major threat. There is a curious belief that the attack on the Sri Lankan cricketers was the handiwork of India.

The war on terror is also seen as an American obsession. As such, sections of the civil society believe that if only the US withdraws, all will be well, not least because the Pakistan army will not have to fight against fellow Muslims.

Coupled with these arguments is the one that the imposition of the Shariat at the behest of the militants in the Swat region is not such an ill-advised move, as the rest of the world thinks, since it will ensure quick justice in accordance with traditional laws. Cricketer Imran Khan is one of those who believes in this suggestion.

Nor is this attitude surprising. Once Pakistan became an Islamic state, it was only one step away from becoming a hardline one. Therefore, when the Taliban insisted on such regulations as a precondition for restoring peace, Islamabad had no option but to yield ground even as Zardari moaned that the Taliban were overrunning the country.

The Pakistan's army's fixation with India and the civil society's acceptance of the zealots as misguided elements - as some in India believe about the Naxalites - have ensured that Pakistan is sleep-walking to its own disaster.#