However, while celebrating the triumph, the winners usually overlook the embedded tragedy. This seems to be happening in the case of the UPA government. Mukherjee's ability to take risk and his skill to manage - or manipulate - legislative majority in a badly fractured house have never been in doubt. That is not the point. The real danger to the Congress party is the victory ending up in megalomania. Sycophants, resourceful lobbyists, favour-seekers and the plain power worshippers all seem to have added a parable of power perpetuity to the UPA. In India's kind of democracy, this is the worst thing that can happen to the rulers.

Already, there are suggestions for a combined push by the PM and Pranab Mukherjee to use the same winning formula to rush with the controversial initiatives like the nuclear liability bill at one go. This is the best time for such a move. The mood is similar to the one that had prevailed after the UPA victory in May, 2009. It was then suggested that since the results marked the popular endorsement of the PM's initiatives like nuclear deal, he should now go ahead in full steam with his vision. Now the veiled hint is that the top duo of the UPA government need not even listen to the excessive caution from the party side.

By far, the most disturbing side effect of Mukherjee's operation victory has been the toxin it has left behind in the body politic. Opposition disunity is just one reason for the government's success. That alone cannot conceal the wanton misuse of the CBI to browbeat the swaying parties like the BSP, Samajwadi Party and Lalu's RJD. The deal with Mayawati has been so blunt and was done so brazenly. She is deeply embroiled in disproportionate asset case in Taj case. Hence suddenly, the CBI tells the Supreme Court that it was ready to consider Mayawati's plea for the closure of her case. This was on April 23 - three days before the cut motion.

Soon after the CBI's assurance in the court, the BSP announces its decision to support the government on the motion. Thus no amount of explanations can conceal the political quid pro quo. And the reason she gave? To defeat the 'communal' BJP on whose support she ruled three times as UP chief minister. Earlier her plan was for a walkout by her 21 MPs at the time of the voting. But distress calls were made to her to vote with the government. As a compromise, the Congress had to hurriedly ask Rahul Gandhi to cease his massive campaign in UP against Mayawati's misrule. We do not know what will happen to Rahul's proposed UP campaign to win Mayawati's Dalits back into the Congress fold.

Similar has been the behaviour of the Mulayam Singh Yadav and Lalu Prasad Yadav, both fully entangled in their own disproportionate assets case. In both cases, the CBI had initiated action and they are in courts. Both are still part of the Left-led group of 13 parties, and were party to its decision to support the cut motion. Just three days before, Mulayam had asserted that the SP had after its bitter experiences since the 2008 episode, has decided to be back in the Left group. What had happened in between is a murky tale that both the UPA operators and the Yadavs will not reveal. Certainly, supporting a CPI leader's cut motion cannot be equated with siding with the 'communal BJP', a reason they had put forth later.

The UPA government's use of CBI for political survival is often compared to Narasimha Rao's political management. True, both the present UPA and Rao had used the same tool. They have successfully worked on the MPs' mortal fear of another election if the incumbent government falls. But instead of the CBI, Rao had found cash transfer as a less obtrusive model for loyalty change. Moreover, Rao, after the initial horse-trading, had resorted to the more durable device of engineering bulk defections from parties like TDP. That was a one-time (or twice) operation.

In the matter of using CBI for political support, UPA can certainly claim the distinction of being on the top. Thus in 2004, a scam-tainted Lalu got the best of terms as price for joining the UPA government. And for six years, there was no forward movement in the CBI cases against him. In terms of political reach and perfection, what happened in July, 2008, has been really a master stroke. The full extent of the professional finesse of the operation has been unveiled during Amar Singh's diatribe with his Samajwadi rivals earlier this year. The expectation in 2008 was that it was a one-time operation to spike the recalcitrant Left and bring nuclear power to every rural home.

However, the overnight switch of loyalties by three regional parties this week signals new trend. Every time the government, any government, faces a trial of strength on the floor of the house, it may be tempted to use such unsavoury methods. Apparently, its repeated use will make such draconian measures an established precedent - like Narasimha Rao's dictum that a minister need not be removed on the basis of a corruption case in court. (i.e. he or she could continue until found guilty). Hence there is every possibility of the 'deal raj' becoming a permanent feature of our system.

There are two other contributory factors. First, since the leaders of most regional outfits are not paraffin of virtues, they will always be soft targets. Second, with the government on a wafer-thin majority, it may be frequently called up on to prove its strength. Another side effect of an easy victory is the prevailing sense of invincibility which is antithesis to responsive governance. We do not know for how long the blame for using the big stick could be confined to an M.K. Narayanan (in 2008) or Mukherjee (now). Sooner or later, the taint will spread to the party's principal leaders Sonia Gandhi and Manmohan Singh. Under our system of vibrant democracy, no one can be free from constant public scrutiny. In UPA's case, perhaps the Congress establishment can still apply some moderation. (IPA Service)