Ever since the electoral process began, it was almost sure that Subianto and his running mate, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, the son of the current President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, will trounce their opponents. He is the chief of the Gerindra Party (acronym for Gerakan Indonesia Raya, 'Great Indonesia Movement') a nationalist, right-wing populist political party.

Incidentally, his challengers Anies Baswedan and Ganjar Pranowo trailed with about 25 percent and 17 percent, respectively, though they are acknowledged as heavyweights. While Anies is backed by Muslim conservatives, Ganjar is supported by the country’s biggest political party, Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle.

His victory however has given rise to conjecture whether he would rule Indonesia on his own terms, or play safe by pursuing the line of Widodo. Amidst this scenario of indistinct nature of policies, the verdict makes it explicit that the polity of the country is taking a rightist turn and in future it would witness acute escalation of war of attrition between China and USA, two superpowers vying to claim supremacy on the region.

Though rightist forces have been active for decades around the globe, it is the ills of unregulated globalisation that has forced large numbers of people closer to populist right-wing nationalism rather than mainstream liberalism and social democracy. The worst affected has of course been the South and Southeast Asia. In India, for example, the Hindu fundamentalists’ identity politics is thriving along with their own private provisioning of social services and neo-liberal oriented economic policies, thus nurturing a local version of the American dream.

Indonesia is no exception. It is a coincidence, in 2014, the year in which Narendra Modi came to power in India, Prabowo Subianto in Indonesia was almost “making a Trump” in the presidential elections. The populist method was to combine antagonistic Muslim identity politics and urban poor people’s resentment against evictions. This election witnessed spread of the right-wing populism. It was the aversion of elites to encourage the moderates that has promoted rightists forces, irrespective of the religious considerations.

Ever since Jokowi became president, China has emerged as Indonesia’s largest trading partner and investor, with Chinese exports to Indonesia surging to $71.32 billion in 2022, up from less than $40 billion in 2014. While this relation is not going to change, USA will certainly have some more space to operate. In 2022, China’s investment in Indonesia, the largest economy in Southeast Asia, surged to US$5.18 billion – the highest level in the past decade. While the number of Chinese-sponsored projects in Indonesia dropped from 1,800 in 2021 to around 1,580 in 2022, the monetary value of these investments skyrocketed by almost 64%.

Indonesia for China has more strategic importance than merely being a business partners. Given China’s rising global power status and presence in Southeast Asia, Indonesia recognises the strategic importance of engaging with China. One thing is absolutely clear that stakes are high for USA and China and their mounting rivalry in the region.

During his stay in power Widodo had played safe and discretely avoided criticising either Beijing or Washington. Though Indonesia looked to China, Widodo preferred to pursue the policy of non-aligned. Significantly Subianto adheres to a policy of neutrality and has also publicly praised the US and China. He cited America’s historical role in pressuring the Netherlands to recognise Indonesian sovereignty in the 1940s, during a forum in November at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies think tank in Jakarta. Subianto nurses anti-Chinese views. But he cannot openly display it as Widodo favours consolidated ties with China.

The economic clout of could be gauged from the remarks of vice president Jusuf Kalla that 90 per cent of Indonesia’s nickel industry was controlled by China. Most of the nickel products from Indonesia’s smelters were exported to China for Chinese domestic needs, thus leaving little benefit for Indonesia. Kalla further criticised the government’s policy for creating dependency on technology from China, particularly in the nickel industry.

For some time, the Indonesian government has been trying to invite larger investments from Western countries, but they have not been too willing. Reasons being cited are Ukraine war, and the Gaza crisis. Yet another reason for their cold-shouldering has been wide presence of China. Quite interesting growing economic role of China in Indonesian economy did not feature in the election. Its strategic location gives Indonesia a crucial position in the maritime component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Indonesia will see almost 10,000 people, including some from the country’s ethnic Chinese minority, competing in Wednesday’s general elections to become one of 580 lawmakers in the national parliament. According to Indonesia’s General Elections Commission (KPU), there are 9,917 candidates representing 18 political parties across 38 provinces. Among those running are Indonesians of Chinese descent, who accounted for about 2.8 million of Indonesia’s then-237 million people, in the 2010 national census. The more recent census in 2020 did not list its ethnicities.

Indonesian academics and intellectuals are sceptical of the future of democracy in their country. They nurse the feeling that the 2024 Presidential Election could be last battle of the Titans. Authoritarian-era elites have long dominated the country’s democratic politics, but now these aging powerbrokers are tussling with a popular president who wants to lead a new generation of kingmakers. Despite this vibrant electoral process, Indonesia’s democracy is still dominated by political, business, and military leaders who built their fortunes during thirty-two years of Suharto’s authoritarian rule.

It is revealing that RSS has been taking intrinsic interest in Indonesia’s politics. Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) began championing “Islam Rahmatan Lil’ Alamin” as its face of moderate Islam in 2002, in the wake of the “Global War on Terror”. In recent times, the campaign has shifted to the new brand of “Islam Nusantara”, which Indonesian diplomats and NU leaders have promoted as an alternative to radicalism.

Local people and media say that Indonesia’s active promotion of “moderate Islam” has gained support from some unlikely allies – members of the far-right. Two prominent global far-right leaders who have thrown their support behind “moderate Islam” are India’s Ram Madhav and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. Madhav has engaged repeatedly with NU leaders since 2020 through his links with the National Awakening Party (PKB), the political party founded by late NU leader and former President Gus Dur and often described as the political vehicle of NU. These meetings have cemented his links with NU leaders, particularly Yahya Cholil Staquf.

The sources maintain that Madhav has embraced “moderate Islam” primarily to justify BJP’s illiberal policies in India, especially in the context of increasing sectarian tensions there. In February 2022, Madhav had written an article on why Indian Muslims need to emulate Indonesian Islam. Referring to Indonesian Muslim practices regarding hijabs, Madhav attempted to defend a hijab ban in the BJP-led state of Karnataka.

On another occasion, Madhav used NU’s opposition to the Caliphate to demand Indian Muslims abandon three key concepts – kafir (unbelievers), ummah (the Muslim community), and jihad (struggle) — and accept the fact that many mosques (including Masjid Babri) were established during the medieval Islamic invasion of what he claims was Hindu land. RSS taking keen interest in politics of Indonesia has been quite intriguing. It has been quite active in Indian diaspora, but at the same time has been striving for making inroad in the Muslim society, which in sharp contrast does believe in core Islamic ethics. (IPA Service)