This time round, Banerjee went several steps further to vent her anger at DVC. She announced severance of West Bengal government’s relations with DVC, withdrew one state representative each from the board of DVC and Damodar Valley Reservoir Regulation Committee, sealed the state’s border with Jharkhand – the other state intimately associated with the multi-purpose utility. She wrote to the Prime Minister pointing out how the state was suffering because of the actions of DVC and its practice of keeping the state government in dark about release of water from its dams which result in floods in several south Bengal districts.

The Union irrigation minister refuted her charge of water being released from DVC without informing the state government in advance. The sealing of border badly affected movement of trucks carrying essential commodities and the situation forced the chief minister to undo the border sealing decision in less than 36 hours. The chief minister also proved that she is not informed about DVC and its role. The withdrawal of the state’s two representatives does not automatically mean the state’s severance of ties with DVC. It only proves that the state government is associated with the organisational arrangements in place for fulfilling DVC’s role and objectives. The multi-purpose utility has a strong presence in power generation and the state gets a hefty share of the total power generated by the organisation.

Flood moderation in the command area is certainly one of the functions of the organisation. But flood moderation in West Bengal is certainly not the sole responsibility of DVC. A major responsibility is that of the state’s irrigation department and the chief minister cleverly avoids any mention of the irrigation department’s functioning. Its responsibilities include regular repair and restoration of embankments, implementation of measures to prevent soil erosion and execution of long-term flood prevention measures. She would not have talked about severing ties had she been adequately briefed by her officials about the organisation structure and roles and responsibilities of DVC. The reality is that West Bengal, like Jharkhand, is a co-promoter of DVC along with the Union government.

In the aftermath of the devastation caused by the turbulent Damodar in the course of 1943, the authorities had set up a committee with eminent physicist Meghnad Saha and the then Maharaja of Burdwan as its members. This committee had suggested the creation of a multi-purpose authority modelled on the Tennessee Valley Authority of the US. A senior TVA engineer W L Voorduin was involved with follow-up work and from the pre-Independence cabinet Dr B R Ambedkar had concretised the proposed authority’s developmental role for the Damodar Basin.

DVC came into existence on July 7, 1948 under the DVC Act of 1948 (Act XIV), which provided for equal shareholding control (not the usual equity route ; it was profit sharing / distribution route) for the three partners – the Centre, West Bengal and Bihar (later Jharkhand). Originally seven dams were proposed but under the then prevailing situation, five were constructed – Tilaya (1953), Konar (1955), Durgapur Barrage (1955), Maithon (1957) and Panchet (1959). The sixth dam was to come up at Balpahari in West Bengal’s Jhargram district. For the seventh dam, a suitable location in Jharkhand was to be identified. Some years back rehabilitation of Konar, Maithon and Panchet was taken up by DVC under the Central Water Commission’s specific scheme at a cost of Rs 143 crore. But efforts to acquire land at Balbahari had faced stiff resistance from the local people. The West Bengal government did little to facilitate matters. DVC was forced by circumstances to drop the project. For the same reason of land acquisition, the proposed additional dam for Jharkhand has remained a pious intention. [It may be mentioned that as all efforts to acquire land failed and the West Bengal government preferred to silence to action, DVC surrendered the Khagra-Joydev coal block in August 2022].

This simply means DVC has much less water holding capacity than originally envisaged. Compounding the problem is the absence of regular desilting warranted on a scale for the last many years. The water holding capacity is 50 per cent of what was created. Extensive desilting is also long overdue for DVC’s 2,494 km canal network – 136.8 km Left Bank main, 88.5 km Right Bank main and 2,069 km of branch canals. It has to be long-drawn, cost-intensive exercise. A few years back, the fund requirement on back-of-the envelope calculation basis was put at Rs 50,000 crore. The three co-owners of DVC , therefore, keep mum on the subject.

Jharkhand’s geographical position being on the upstream of Damodar river, water release is not a major issue. It, however, becomes an issue when there is excessive rainfall and it releases water from the Tenughat dam which it owns. West Bengal being the lower riparian state, it faces more problems when water is released to save the dams from damage from heavy, incessant rainfall. But, the chief minister’s allegation that the state is never given advance intimation does not hold water. She also has to see that the state irrigation department does its job. The Ghatal master plan has been talked about for several years. It being a project of national importance, the Centre’s close involvement in execution is a must. The Centre’s power and irrigation ministries have to step in to save DVC, which remains a shining example of cooperative federalism but it is now a victim of neglect.

Given how DVC is structured under a Central legislation, Mamata’s decision to severe ties with the organisation is not reasonable. She should better enlist the cooperation of the Jharkhand government and together urge the Union government to formulate a DVC rescue and rehabilitation programme, which should start with land acquisition for the two long pending dam project and include desilting on an emergency basis. (IPA Service)