Answers to such questions will depend on factors like the outcome of the war, USA's role, India's reaction to events, whether Pakistani rulers have learnt lesson from their failed past aggressions for annexing Jammu and Kashmir and, most importantly, Jammu and Kashmir's internal situation.

There are reasons to assume that the war against terrorism in Pakistan will be won. The optimism is based on four factors. America, which had earlier forced Pervez Musharraf to snap his ties with the Taliban -though the ISI and some Army elements had clandestinely continued their support to the terrorist outfits — has now also prodded his reluctant successors to stop offering Taliban the olive branch and launch offensive against them.

The second and the most crucial factor is the US success in forcing Pakistan Army's top brass to launch war against the terrorists. Significantly, it was after Pakistan Army Chief Kayani's return from the US that the Army launched its onslaught against the Taliban. To achieve its objectives, the US has been using its money and muscle power. The annual aid to Pakistan has now been trebled to 1.5 billion dollars. It is not a philanthropist's act. It is the US's geo-political and strategic interests that have prompted the global cop to turn into a donor and peace-enforcing apostle in the region, at least for the present. But in the process it has converted Pakistan into more than its client state, virtually a colony.

The third factor that may help win the anti-terror war is the Pakistani ruling elite's survival compulsions. After making Pakistan's tribal belt bordering Afghanistan their bastion for operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan and occupying the Swat belt, the Taliban planned to extend their operations to entire Pakistan. This unnerved the ruling class and forced it to decide to go on the offensive against the Taliban.

The fourth factor is that the escalating terrorist violence has generated strong public opinion in Pakistan against terrorists and religious extremists. This is going to be a big help to the security forces in curbing the menace.

India is naturally worried over the turn of events in Pakistan. Their success will make India their next target. New Delhi has repeatedly declared that a destabilised Pakistan is not in India's interest. Adoption of a common strategy and coordinated actions for controlling terrorism in the two countries is imperative. But such an approach can fructify only after Pakistan dismantles its terrorist infrastructure, stop using terrorism as an instrument of state policy and not allows the use of its territory by terrorists to attack other countries. Pakistan's making resolution of all problems between the two countries conditional to Kashmir issue's solution will only mean status quo in the relations. India's stand is that the creation of an atmosphere conducive for restarting dialogue is imperative. And for creating such an atmosphere, the first step Pakistan needs to take is to act resolutely against the perpetrators of the 26/11 Mumbai attack which it has been avoiding advancing unconvincing excuses.

Pakistan's present rulers cannot be ignorant of the fact that it was by creating a conducive atmosphere that India and Pakistan were twice on the verge of resolving the Kashmir issue during the last 15 years. But Pakistani's Kargil misadventure and later escalation of ISI-backed terrorist acts in India turned the clock back.

Pakistan is now trying to use the Obama government's good offices to make Kashmir a priority issue on India-Pakistan composite dialogue agenda whenever it is taken up. Conscious of India's opposition to third party intervention, the Obama administration is avoiding looking a mediator and instead is using subtle ways to include Kashmir in its Pak-Afg agenda. Such moves are bound to hurt India's sensitivities and development of closer India-US relations.

Terrorist violence no longer poses a serious threat to Jammu and Kashmir's security situation. Pakistan and its Army, sponsors and abettors of terrorism, are preoccupied with controlling the scourge in their country. Indian security forces' stepped-up vigilance has substantially curbed infiltration. Pakistan's failure to grab Kashmir through proxy wars like October 1947 tribal invasion, Kargil and armed incursions must have convinced Islamabad that it cannot achieve its objective by force.

With external threats having receded and normality fast returning in Jammu and Kashmir, it is the frequent eruption of unrest in the Valley that should be a cause of concern demanding remedial steps both at political and administrative levels. Last year's massive protests on the Amarnath land controversy and the big response the separatists bandh calls have been evoking are indicative of the Valley's alienation. No doubt, there are unbridgeable differences between the hardliner and moderate separatists. But whatever their compulsions the latter often toe the former's line. Succumbing to hardliners pressure, the moderates reversed their decision of not issuing a call for Lok Sabha poll boycott.

A major factor proving unhelpful for improving the situation is the lacklustre functioning of the six-month-old NC-Congress coalition government. No doubt, the young Omar Abdullah is a well-intentioned and forward-looking Chief Minister anxious to ensure the state's fast development. And after the December Assembly elections, the poll code of conduct also shortened his government's effective functioning period to just two-and-a-months. But his handling of such sensitive issues as the death of two Shopian women under mysterious circumstances illustrates his administrative shortcomings. Omar perhaps needs a think tank of experienced political and administrative experts to guide him on crucial matters, at least for some period.

While external factors including terrorists activities need continued tackling as effectively as hitherto, it is the internal issues, particularly improvement in governance which need to be on the ruling coalition and New Delhi's priority agenda. (IPA Service)