But what is rarely visible has been the rapidly growing business and trade entanglement between the two sides. This has created a powerful interest group in India with an entirely different perception of the relationship. The schism between the armchair strategic community and the hard-nosed business mark our entire China debate. Consider the following events that had happened this month in a span of 72 hours.

- Chinese firm ZTE signs a multi-million contract with Reliance Communications to supply 2G and 3G equipment for eight out of its 13 network circles. It was once banned by the government on security ground but later lifted after the service providers put fierce pressures on the PMO to have them the best and cheapest option. Others like Tata Teleservices are also negotiating for equipment from ZTE or Huawei.

- In Beijing, Kapil Sibal announces decision to introduce Mandarin at primary levels by the CBSC on a reciprocal basis. He also offers Fulbright-style scholarship on a mutual basis and assured to remove visa restrictions for Chinese scholars teaching in Indian institutions.

- After negotiations in Beijing, Kamal Nath reveals the awarding of contracts to Chinese construction firms for building highways in Jammu and Kashmir. His another disclosure was that Chinese firms like CGGC, CEC, JTEC and Gezhouba Water and Power are already involved in highway construction in India. India, he said, was considering the relaxation of visa rules for Chinese workers which Indian private firms are demanding.

- At Chennai, Huawei announces decision to set up a $500 million plant to produce telecom equipment for Indian service providers. With exports also in view, the factory will come up at Sriperumpudur.

- Last month, Sachin Pilot announced the government's decision to allow BSNL and MTNL to bid for Chinese suppliers, including in sensitive areas like Jammu and Kashmir and north-east. Four months back, Tata Telecom had formally batted for the more cost efficient Chinese equipment.

- Last month, again, Indian private power producers like Tata Power, Reliance Power, Essar, Adani, Jindal, GMR, DVK and Lanco group had joined hands to seek withdrawal of what they said discriminatory treatment to Chinese firms in the matter of power equipment imports. Otherwise, they warned, cost of power produced will go up.

The business link with China is certainly deeper and wide. It is not a one-way traffic. What is not widely known is that a large number of our smaller players are getting foothold in niche equipment supply and erection contracts for construction work in China. The areas include malls, building and factory complexes. Indian designers and technicians work in large numbers both here and China for their firms. The increasing number of flight to Hong Kong, Shanghai and Beijing is a testimony to this growing interaction. Power of market forces in a globalised economy is so strong that it tends to tear off both the old mental block and cold war blocs. This is a powerful bonding, downplayed in the whole of our China discourse but deeply felt in the policy domain. And this explains the government's extreme caution in dealing with the dragon stories.

The China debate is dominated by three sets of actors. First is the shrill of the highly visible strategic 'community' who seem to overwhelm the media. Steeped in cold war trappings, they are fed on western material like 'string of pearls'. The usually mentioned pearls are Gwadar military base in Pakistan, the deep sea port at Cox Bazar in Bangladesh, Hambantota port and now Colombo in Sri Lanka, 'outposts' in eastern Africa, Seychelles, Mauritius, Maldives, Myanmar and Cambodia. However, barring perhaps one, the rest are purely construction contracts without any military content. The strategic writers also see much danger in China building roads, rail lines and laying pipe lines to as wide spots as Myanmr, Chittagong, Sonadia port in Bangladesh, Gilgit-Baltistan in Pak-occupied Kashmir, Gwadar in Pakistan, Caspian Sea through Central Asia.

If one goes by Kamal Nath, there is now a 'pearl' in Kashmir a s well. For the strategic writers, the routine reports of China's search for fuel and alternative port outlets are security challenges. Thus to counter the dragon, they fiercely advocate massive defence build-up and regional military alliances. There are veiled attacks on defence minister A.K. Antony for not rising up to the occasion. In the second category are the 'cultural nationalists' and those who remain in the trappings of the pre-globalisation mindset. These sections still live in the nightmare of the yellow hordes storming 'NEFA' (now Arunachal) as nation watches in humiliation.

The third category comprises those broadly subscribe to the 'Chindia' concept. Among them are half a dozen union ministers who find fundamental flaws in the confrontationist prescriptions. One of them, a committed globaliser himself, dubs China as a big bania. Can a country whose entire growth strategy depends on exports and investments, ever bring doom to itself by launching a classical kind of war, he asks a group of newsmen during an informal chat. A bania may use bullies but will never hurt own business. Paranoia and frenzy will only distract our growth programmes. Chindiawallas assert that apart from taking reasonable precautions, the best way to counter the dragon is to outdo it by expanding our own economy and trade reach.

The biggest obstacle in the way of the strategic confrontationists is the business and trade. With huge stake in China - in trade, investment and equipment - they quietly but firmly dissuade the government from making extreme responses. At times, they had made subtle intervention. China policy is an issue on which the reform establishment stands sharply divided. The Chindiawallas ridicule the confrontationist thesis that Beijing is entirely India-centric. It is naïve to attribute motives to their business activities elsewhere. The Chinese, for instance, have similar problems with Japan, Taiwan and Vietnam with a serious stand off developing in South China Sea. Right now China is in a diplomatic confrontation with Japan.

Those who have had lots of interaction with Beijing, say decision making structure in China is also marred by pulls and pressures by different actors. A closer look will show that the differences between the armchair strategists and the Chindiawallas not about defence buildup. The latter is not even against establishing reasonable parity. Their objections are to deliberately whipping up mutual tension and dragging the country into cold war-like alliances against the neighbour. Any such design will damage our own growth process. (IPA Service)