In India, too, there are nay-sayers such as the Hindu fundamentalists, one of whom had advised Atal Behari Vajpayee in 1999 to go to Lahore in a tank and not a bus, and also those in the opposition, both in the BJP and the Left, who believe that painting the government as pro-Pakistani is the best way to undermine its position. It is a stance akin to the familiar criticism of the Congress as pro-Muslim.

Although this line of attack failed to yield dividends for these parties in the recent parliamentary poll, that hasn't discouraged them from continuing with such censure in the aftermath of the Manmohan Singh-Yousuf Raja Gilani statement. The BJP has been quickly off the mark, sensing an opportunity to revive its morale with an ultra-nationalist stance.

The Sharm-el-Sheikh document has been lambasted, therefore, as a capitulation, especially after the tough stance which the prime minister took in front of the media in his conversations with Asif Ali Zardari a few weeks ago. As may be expected, the hand of America has also been seen behind the supposed Indian retreat by the Samajwadi Party, among others.

Admittedly, the surprising reference to Baluchistan in the joint statement has provided additional grist to the critics' mill. There is little doubt that it has given Pakistan a stick with which to beat India whenever the latter raises the question of Pakistani involvement in Kashmir. As is known, an insistence on proof plays no part in such propaganda ploys. Manmohan Singh's assertion, therefore, that India's record in Baluchistan is an “open book” is neither here nor there.

Since the reference to Baluchistan was made in the context of the two countries deciding to share “actionable information on any future terrorist threats”, India could have insisted on including the recent intelligence inputs on a fresh LeT offensive in Mumbai although Pakistan now refers to it as a “defunct organisation”.

Apart from the Baluchistan faux pas, the revival of the dialogue process may not have too many dissenters outside the habitual grumblers. The reason is that it would have been highly unrealistic to expect the world to accept a situation where the two nuclear powers remained incommunicado for months on end.

While the rest of the world understood India's decision following the Mumbai massacres to call of the talks and insist on Pakistan taking credible action against its home-grown terrorists before resuming the negotiations, the process of not being on speaking terms could not continue indefinitely.

If the critics of the Sharm-el-Sheikh meeting are still in favour of a near-permanent breach between the two countries, the reason has more to do with domestic politics than the requirements of international diplomacy.

Any belief that their recent electoral setbacks will make the BJP and other opposition parties more responsible has been belied by their latest actions. As before, they are again trying to portray Manmohan Singh as “weak” even though the charge had backfired on them before the elections.

One of their objections is the decision to delink “action on terrorism” from the dialogue process. Although India had insisted on such a linkage earlier, including the dismantling of the terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan, it must have subsequently realized the impossibility of Islamabad being able to fulfil such a condition in the foreseeable future.

India had no option, therefore, but to be satisfied with the promised action against the LeT operatives such as Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi, Zarar Shah and others. Clearly, this isn't enough, especially at a time when not only the rogue elements in the ISI and the army are believed to be hand-in-glove with the terrorists, but even the judiciary is trying to show its independence after years of subservience to the military by refusing to act against suspects like Hafiz Saeed on the grounds that the prosecution has not proved its charges.

The restraint which India showed after 26/11 frustrated those in Pakistan who were hoping that a war would turn the focus away from the PakAf region to the benefit of the terrorists, who are believed to be regarded by the ISI and the army as their “strategic assets”. Since there was no war, the Pakistan army not only had to launch an operation in Swat and elsewhere in the north-west, even if reluctantly, the establishment in Islamabad also had to try and curb the militants, whom it had nurtured for so many years.

After Sharm-el-Sheikh, India has to build on the progress made so far by holding talks only if visible action is taken against the terror groups. The message to Pakistan should be that the slightest sign of backtracking by it will once again lead to a dead end. (IPA Service)