More worryingly for the ruling Left Front, there is simply no end to its nightmare that began on March 14, 2007, a black day when 14 poor villagers were killed in police firing at Nandigram. January 7, 2011 would be another such day, as 8 people including five women, again very poor, were ruthlessly shot dead from close range by CPI-M-backed goons at village Netai.

If Nandigram had reduced the CPI-M to the level of damaged goods all over India, the Netai massacre could well be equally bruising to the party’s image. Nandigram could be explained as an accidental one-off aberration, as pre-poll campaigning for the high stakes Assembly elections to be held this year gets under way. There were signs that the ruling Front was in the process of recovering some of its lost ground to the Trinamool Congress in recent months.

But the fresh killings at Netai effectively demonstrate that the CPI-M has learnt nothing from its experience at Nandigram. Its armed goons continue to mow down the poorest of the rural poor in the troubled, violence-racked Midnapore district in the name of class struggle. All talk of rectifying the party’s “errors” and action against the corrupt means nothing.

Predictably, the CPI-M hours after the massacre, fell back on its familiar time-worn tactic: its captive print and electronic media spouted the hoary conspiracy theory, another moth-eaten Marxist cliché, as universal outrage broke out. The party blamed the Trinamool Congress (TMC) and the Maoists. Except the CPI, no other party or group supported this version. Intellectuals, who took to the streets, ridiculed such claims.

What had happened at Netai was simple. Armed cadres of the CPI-M, whose numbers ranged from 22 to 40, began occupying a two-storeyed house in the village, belonging to a supporter who now lives elsewhere. They had modern weapons including revolvers, AK 47s and bombs, and even crude home made cannons. The local police knew about them and did not interfere.

These cadres were returning to their old stronghold, from which they had been displaced by the Maoists. The joint anti-Maoist operation put the Maoists on the run. On return, they treated nearby villagers as their serfs. As villagers told newsmen and the police later, they had to provide meals for these people, guard them at night and run other errands. The police did not exist.

Since the villagers were very poor, they found the situation intolerable. As a schoolboy told newsmen, ”Anyone over the age of 12 had to work for these people, even stand guard duty at nights, braving the cold, as armed men slept in comfort in the pucca house. It seemed odd, unarmed poor people guarding those well armed men…”.

As discontent grew, the cadres broke the camel’s back by ordering that everyone aged over 14 would have to undergo arms training daily. Locals resisted, saying that it was hard enough for them to feed and guard the cadres, given their poverty and the lack of earnings. But sending children away from schools and farms to learn arms training was out of the question.

The firing occurred as about 1000 locals including women, went in a determined body up to the house to discuss the problem with the armed men — and committed the blunder of their lives. They forgot that that the art of negotiating was it was not the strong point of bullies.

As CPI-M sources themselves admitted, the cadres were unnerved by the size of the crowd and felt under siege. Even as some debated whether the arms training should be organised or not, others quietly phoned other district CPI-M leaders complaining they were surrounded and called for reinforcements.

This reaction is not untypical of people who are aware of their unpopularity in a troubled region. As soon as “reinforcements”, in the shape of car-borne armed cadres reached from nearby areas, those inside the house opened fire, in which their helpers joined. In no time at all, the unarmed, scared crowd scattered in all directions and 15/20 people, including several women, lay injured on the ground. Some died on the spot, while others died later. Allegedly the cadres did not allow ambulance or other help to attend the wounded.

The fig-leaf of the conspiracy theory was exposed by the behaviour of top CPI-M leaders themselves. Even hours after the incident, the mobile phones of Mohammad Selim remained switched off, as was Shyamal Chakravarty’s. Among local leaders, Dipak Sarkar avoided comments, being away at Nashik to attend a conference. Sushanta Ghosh came on the line only with a promise to learn what happened and get back. He never did. It was alleged that the gunmen had been sent by him, but it could not be confirmed. Mr. Madan Ghosh also declined comments.

Party Secretary Biman Bose alleged vaguely that the TMC and the Maoists had created trouble, while Chief Minister Bhattacharjee did not comment until the following day. The next day, he told a public meeting that, ”It would have been better if what has happened at Lalgarh did not happen. We do not support violence and all parties have a role to play.” He might have been asked to write an essay on political violence.

Naturally the TMC, the Congress and the BJP all went to town, organising a series of rallies and protests, some even calling for a bandh. Intellectuals demanded the resignation of the Chief Minister.

Party insiders said Bhattacharjee, livid over the matter, threatened to quit, but was persuaded to continue by party seniors, who said it would simply sink the CPI-M in the coming polls. There was no confirmation of this.

Surprisingly, Ms Mamata Banerjee remained remarkably calm and dignified through it all. She visited Lalgarh the following day and met the affected families, offering them consolation. She reminded Bhattacharjee that the people of the state would give him a befitting reply, not through bullets, but ballots. Hers was a faultless and fitting performance. But Bengal’s cup of misery was overflowing. (IPA Service)