The Maoists are still around, of course, but they no longer appear to be as menacing as when the prime minister called them the gravest internal security threat. In retrospect, that was probably an overestimation since, after a period of mayhem when they killed scores of security personnel and blew up railway stations and other government buildings in the countryside, their threat has apparently been neutralized to a considerable extent.

The Maoists were evidently able to get away with their earlier depredations because the security forces were somewhat casual in their operations since they did not quite anticipate the determination and firepower of the insurgents. But having learnt their lesson, the forces have clearly been able to hit back with some success.

However, the ULFA’s capitulation should serve as a lesson for the Maoists. The Assamese group began its revolutionary journey about three decades ago by exploiting the grievances of the locals just as the Maoists are claiming to be fighting for tribal rights. Unlike the Maoists, however, who are virtually alone as a militant force in their jungle habitat, the ULFA operated in an atmosphere of rebellion caused by the presence of a number of secessionist outfits in the north-east.

In Assam itself, the AASU had carried out a violent agitation against the illegal immigrants from Bangladesh from 1979 till it entered mainstream politics after signing an accord with the centre in 1985. Incidentally, the Mizo National Front, too, followed the same route by signing an agreement with the centre in 1986 to end more than 25 years of armed resistance.

But although the AASU called off its movement, the ULFA continued to operate from the underground. Its survival as well as gains as a political force can be explained by the fact that Assam’s resentment about being neglected by the centre persisted along with the failure of the AASU leaders to address its problems despite being in power.

The AASU’s disintegration after the rupture between its two senior leaders, Prafulla Mahanta and Bhrigu Phukan, paved the way for the Congress’s return in 2001. This, in turn, enabled the ULFA to consolidate its base by claiming that the traditional elements who were less than sympathetic to Assam’s grouses were in power again. But, by then, the pressure of the security forces had compelled its top leaders like Arabinda Rajkhowa and Paresh Barua to seek shelter in Bangladesh and Myanmar.

East Pakistan/Bangladesh and Myanmar have been the traditional hideouts of the north-eastern outlaws. Laldenga, too, had found a safe haven in East Pakistan after the MNF’s formation in 1960. But the creation of Bangladesh in 1971 not only forced the MNF to look for succour in Myanmar, but was a major reason why the revolt subsided with Laldenga becoming the Mizoram chief minister in 1986.

Similarly, the ascent of the India-friendly regime of Sheikh Hasina in Bangladesh meant that the ULFA fugitives could no longer continue to enjoy Dhaka’s hospitality. But the loss of a secure hideout was not the only reason why the rebels gave up the ghost, so to say. A more substantial reason was the ULFA’s rejection of the longstanding grouses about the Assamese about the presence of outsiders in the state, whether from West Bengal or from Bangladesh.

The ULFA’s and AASU’s predecessor was the Lachit Sena, which carried out a series of anti-Bengali agitations in the 1960s. Then came the AASU’s anti-foreigner movement, which made sizable sections of Bengalis from West Bengal leave the state in fear although the AASU’s target was the Bangladeshis. However, since the mother tongue of both the groups was Bengali, they could not always be differentiated in the rural areas.

However, the shelter provided by the Bangladesh to the ULFA leaders meant that they could no longer criticize the illegal inflow. Not only that, the ULFA even carried out an attack on Bihari Hindu labourers in Assam in early 2007, reportedly at the behest of the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence of Bangladesh (DGFI). The ISI’s hidden hand was also suspected in the attack.

Apart from the disorientation caused by the ULFA’s alien place of refuge, what must have also undermined its resolve was the realization of the futility of a prolonged struggle against a fairly powerful state. Besides, the democratic system ensured that the average citizen never lost hope about changing the regime via the ballot. The fall of governments at the centre and in the states such as those of Atal Behari Vajpayee’s in 2004 and Lalu Yadav’s RJD in 2005 kept the hope alive. The ULFA’s failure has shown yet again that a revolutionary upsurge has no chance of success in a democracy. (IPA Service)