This is not to minimise the importance of eliminating the world’s most wanted criminal, whose campaign of terror killed almost 3,000 civilians in the US. Nor is it to belittle the enormous intelligence-gathering effort that went into tracking Osama in Abbottabad, a garrison town just 60 km from Islamabad. Least of all does this mean shedding tears for Osama.

However, full justice would demand not just doing to al-Qaeda what it did to US citizens, but something substantially more: punishing the 9/11 culprits after conclusively establishing their guilt in a fair public trial, while beginning a process of social healing by addressing the root-causes of the grievances that jehadi terrorists cynically exploit. These grievances—about the West’s arrogance and its global hegemony project, demonisation of Islam, and Israel’s occupation of Palestine—are genuine and must be redressed humanely and in the spirit of grand reconciliation.

The present outburst of nationalist hysteria and triumphalism in the US is a far cry from this. The depiction of Liberty holding Osama’s severed head in one hand and the torch of freedom in the other is as demented and revenge-driven as al-Qaeda’s celebration of violence and its equation of the US with Satan. What many Americans are expressing is their hubris in the aggressive reaffirmation of the US’s military power and influence. That’s why the Republicans are lavishing praise upon Mr Obama, who now seems certain to win his second term as President.

Yet, a balance-sheet of the US’s anti-terror achievements shows a huge deficit. The day after 9/11, President George W Bush launched a Global War on Terror (GWoT), which would be unlimited in time, and cover scores of countries. He began by invading Afghanistan. In 2003, he invaded Iraq after citing al-Qaeda’s growing influence there and the existence of weapons of mass destruction—a patent falsehood. GWoT then spread to the Horn of Africa and Southeast Asia.

GWoT has so far caused an estimated 1.2 million civilian casualties in Iraq and another 20,000 in Afghanistan, besides 6,000 US military casualties (double the number of civilians killed in 9/11).

The US has spent $1.3 trillion on GWoT without securing an end to terrorism. Since 9/11, there have been 13 major terrorist attacks in different countries, in which over 1,000 people died. Many of these were by groups other than al-Qaeda. The jehadi ideology caught on, as did the idea that citizens of mighty states like the US are vulnerable. Al-Qaeda has evolved into a decentralised “franchise” organisation: there’s no unifying top-level command, but groups can act autonomously.

Politically, the US lost some of its key allies as a result of its decision to wage war against Iraq. Washington for the first time faced the humiliation of even small countries like Cameroon, Angola and Guinea refusing to vote for the war in the Security Council. The US couldn’t get a Council resolution passed authorising war. Allies who supported President Bush lost domestic elections thanks to public discontent against the war.

Not least, the US response to 9/11 perverted the notion of justice. The US recklessly violated its citizens’ civil liberties and resorted to torture. Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay will remain abiding reminders of inhuman detention and extremely coercive interrogation. Washington also instigated “rendition” of terror suspects to third countries which have scant regard for legality.

The US also bypassed its courts and international tribunals and branded terror suspects enemy “combatants” who didn’t deserve regular trial. Bin Laden thus succeeded in getting the US to negate some of the democratic achievements that Americans are (rightly) proud of, and in returning the US state from modernity to the medieval culture of torture.

This, by any reckoning, was an exorbitant price to pay for prosecuting GWoT. Yet, President Obama declared victory after Operation Geronimo, deplorably named after an American-Indian hero, betraying genocidal racial prejudice.

The US conducted a targeted assassination of Osama, when it could have captured him. Osama was unarmed. It squandered a chance to detain Osama lawfully, hold him to account for unleashing terror, and punish him by due process. Putting him on trial, and a scrupulously fair one at that, would have highlighted his demonic ideology and excesses before the whole world, including millions of Muslims.

Ironically, President Obama, a Nobel peace laureate, boasted: “We are once again reminded that America can do whatever we set our mind to.” The menacing potential for abuse of power contained in this should worry many people across the world.

Many people might treat the US action in Abbottabad as legitimate because of the risk that the ISI would alert Osama if it got to know of the operation. But it involved a blatant violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty and deep penetration of CIA agents into its territory. The extension of this logic to other countries could produce horrendous illegalities and human rights violations—as the NATO invasion of Libya shows.

Osama’s killing will further weaken al-Qaeda, which has already become marginalised in the Arab world. The Arab Spring doesn’t derive its inspiration from global jehad against a universal enemy. Rather, it aims to depose domestic dictators. However, al-Qaeda and its supporters haven’t been decisively defeated. They may still be capable of launching murderous attacks in Pakistan and elsewhere, and Mumbai-type operations against India. This should be a sobering thought.

Osama’s killing has impelled some Indian hardliners to clamour for “taking out” Pakistan-based jehadi extremists like Hafiz Mahmood Saeed and Masood Azhar through “covert operations”. This is a counsel for adventurism of the worst kind, which risks war and destruction. Contrary to its military leaders’ claims, India simply doesn’t have the technological-military capability for doing this. Nor should it even consider imitating the US in invading other countries.

The Abbottabad episode highlights numerous truths about al-Qaeda and Pakistan. It’s inconceivable that Osama didn’t have a support base in Pakistan provided by the ISI or Pakistan Army, or some of their factions. It defies logic that he could have stayed for five to six years in a fortified mansion next door to the Pakistan Military Academy without the Army/ISI’s knowledge.

This is part of the duplicity long practised by the Pakistan Army in hunting with US hounds and running with the al-Qaeda-Taliban hare. The Pakistan Army stands exposed and shamed the world over. This will weaken Pakistan’s bargaining power vis-à-vis the US in extracting military and economic aid and tilt the balance in the bilateral relationship in Washington’s favour.

Osama’s elimination will allow President Obama to begin rapid troop withdrawal from Afghanistan in July. For many Americans, the Osama manhunt was GWoT’s only rationale. Currently, the US has 100,000 soldiers in Afghanistan, up from 34,000 three years ago. Before it withdraws, the US will try to cut a deal with the “moderate” Taliban to put them in power in Afghanistan.

The ISI will want to play kingmaker here and monopolise the process of representing and mediating for the Taliban. The ISI showed last year that it would do its utmost to be part of any negotiation with the Taliban. It tracked down Mullah Baradar, a “moderate” Taliban leader, with the US’s technological support in Karachi. It knew Washington was keen to talk to him. As soon as Baradar was tracked, the ISI kidnapped him and sabotaged US plans.

However, a purely Taliban-based settlement involving only one of Afghanistan’s ethnic groups, the Pashtuns, won’t be viable or durable. What’s needed is a broad-based settlement, which includes other groups like the Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras, and which is endorsed and guaranteed by the regional powers, including Pakistan, India, Russia and Iran.

This confronts India with a formidable challenge, that of demanding such a regional approach, while simultaneously sustaining the dialogue process with Pakistan which strengthens and wins over the pro-peace domestic constituency there which would like to establish civilian control over the Army and rein in the ISI. The first task entails that India take a fiercely independent foreign policy stance, especially on Iran’s inclusion, which the US can be expected to oppose dogmatically.

The alternative is falling in line with Washington and colluding with it in worsening the mess in Afghanistan, in which extremist forces will thrive. This will turn the country into a cauldron of discontent and violence, in which jehadis can thrive and threaten India’s security.

The Afghanistan challenge will prove a litmus test not just for India’s diplomacy, but its foreign policy independence. India cannot afford to fail it. The security, stability and democratic evolution of the entire northwestern part of South Asia are at stake. We must prepare a mature, morally clear and bold response to the challenge. (IPA Service)