Ms Banerjee’s objections to the proposed terms of the accord are understandable from a West Bengal perspective. Less easy to understand is why the centre allows her to stall the decision making process on a critical issue, directly impacting sensitive bilateral relations.
The centre’s stand, as explained by Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh to his Bangladesh counterpart Sheikh Hasina, is that the views of West Bengal as a participating state in the accord cannot be ignored. However, all efforts are on to persuade Ms Banerjee and reach an accord.
This writer has stated in these columns earlier that the expert report on the water availability issue, prepared by Dr Kalyan Rudra, has been ready for some time. But the West Bengal Chief Minister’s office maintains a stoic silence. Unconfirmed reports suggest that Ms Banerjee is getting her own back against the centre by “killing” all negotiations and ignoring frantic appeals by Bangladesh leaders. Violating minimal diplomatic norms, she and her ministers criticise the Congress publicly for pushing her on the issue, alleging that West Bengal’s interests should not be surrendered to make it easy for political parties in other countries to win elections!
Ms Banerjee cannot forget that the UPA-II government has not agreed to her request for a special package for the debt-ridden state she rules, nor allowed a three-year moratorium on its annual debt repayment, to the tune of Rs 22,000 crore, a national record!
This may or may not be true, but those who know Ms Banerjee’s style of functioning, her relentless aggression in pushing her individual agenda, would not find this hard to believe, with all respect. The aborted Nano car factory at Singur is but one such example.
Such a discord involving a particular state, a neighbouring country and the centre, exposes the Constitutional limitations that plague normal functioning within a federal structure, 65 years after Independence.
Kolkata-based analysts are deeply worried about the impact on bilateral relations and on Bangladesh politics, of Ms Banerjee’s stubbornness. If there is no agreement between Bangladesh and India on Teesta by 2014, bilateral relations would suffer a major setback. The Awami League led by Ms Hasina, on a none too secure wicket at present, may face a massive defeat in the 2014 general elections.
Should that happen, it would not be just Ms Hasina, or the Awami Leaguers who would be sorry. India may end up with far bigger problems than Bangladesh, problems not difficult to anticipate if one puts present developments within the recent context of politics in Bangladesh.
It is common knowledge that the League (AL) being more receptive to India than other parties in Bangladesh, labours under the enduring stigma in as being the “agents” of the bigger neighbour. Since the AL won the national elections in 2009, there has been a sea change in bilateral relations, much to the relief and satisfaction of both countries.
Ms Banerjee’s refusal even to reopen negotiations on the Teesta waters costs India dearly. Dhaka retaliated by not finalising the long awaited transit rights treaty with India. The cost in terms of time and fuel for movement of goods and items by a tortuous route to the NE states from the Indian mainland, would have been reduced by around 70 percent for India, by using direct routes within Bangladesh. The smaller country would also have earned considerable revenues, estimated between $1.5 to $2 billion annually, from fees and expenses to be paid by India for such a passage, not to mention the development of its infrastructure. Border roads development and trade in both countries would also have received a major boost.
Her failure to conclude the Teesta treaty has damaged Ms Hasina’s standing already. As researcher Mr Bhumitra Chakma notes in a recent paper, the glitch over the water sharing accord has “increased domestic pressure on the Hasina government. Right wing political parties in Bangladesh are urging the (Bangladesh) Government to change its pro-India policy orientation. This pressure will increase further as elections approach in 2014.” Therefore only fundamentalists and Islamists will stand to gain from Ms Hasina’s failure and one need not be a Bangladesh expert to deduce that. The question is, what will happen after Ms Hasina steps down?
The scenario could be disastrous for India. On its West, US/NATO forces are scheduled to quit Afghanistan by 2014, after which only a token Western presence may be maintained. Pakistan would certainly face increasing pressure from the Taliban and Al Qaeda. There are concerns over the safety of the proposed energy pipeline to India from Turkmenistan, which may prove difficult to secure, as it would run through Pakistan and Afghanistan. There is every possibility of revived violence in the Kashmir region and other parts of India.
The defeat of the AL in 2014 Bangladesh polls, could lead to a similar situation for India on its East. Such an assertion may seem alarmist, until once stops to recall certain recent events in Bangladesh.
During the AL rule, within the short space of 3 years only, the two countries have made major progress in addressing their differences over land and border issues. The problem of 57 Bangladeshi enclaves in India and 111 Indian enclaves in Bangladesh has been solved. To settle maritime boundary disputes in the Bay of Bengal, both countries will accept the verdict defining the limits of Bangladeshi control in the seas by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). As for bilateral trade, there is a trade gap of $4 billion in favour of India. The bigger country has put 47 new items from Bangladesh on the tariff-free list, to ensure additional revenues of $1 billion for Dhaka.
Bangladesh will receive 250 megawatts of power from India and can bid for an additional supply of 250 MW, if needed. India will help Bangladesh build a new 1320 MW power plant in Khulna, near the Sundarbans. Bangladesh allows India to use Chittagong and Mongla ports and facilities at Ashuganj, which helped India set up the 720 MW Palatana power plant in Tripura in quick time. Heavy equipment was moved by the cheaper river route, through Bangladesh. Bangladesh can also draw power from Palatana.
But the biggest co-operation has occurred in the sphere of internal and external security for both countries. Bangladesh has recently handed over several top ULFA and Bodo extremist leaders including Arabinda Rajkhowa, Sasadhar Choudhury, Chitraban Hazarika, and Hitesh Kalita to India. Huge quantities of arms and ammunition meant for sabotage and mayhem in India were seized. ULFA leader Anup Chetia may be extradited soon. The Indian intelligence alerted Dhaka early this year about a secret plot by Jihadist elements in the Bangladesh army, seeking to overthrow the elected government, killing or imprisoning the Prime Minister. These confidence building measures, have improved the overall political stability and security of South Asia.
The current situation presents a happy contrast from the kind of relations between Bangladesh and India during the last spell of BNP rule under Ms Khaleda Zia. Indian insurgents were comfortably ensconced in Bangladesh, planning and executing acts of sabotage in India in Assam, North and South India and West Bengal. They were running business units in Dhaka and Bangkok. Pressure on the Hindus and other minorities became intolerable. Dhaka had granted special flight monitoring rights to the Chinese after Ms Zia visited Beijing. The ISI had set up offices in the country. Hundreds of “volunteers” from Bangladesh were being recruited for training in Pakistan and Afghanistan. They went to work in Kashmir, Chechnya, Bosnia and other parts of the world. True, the US and EU countries began pressuring Ms Zia to end her honeymoon with Jihadist elements, but she could not dismount from the tiger she had befriended. And the US became serious about confronting Islamic terrorism in South Asia only after 9/11 incidents, not before.
It would be disastrous for India if South Bloc officials develop a memory block and forget the 2001-2006 period in Bangladesh.
On her recent visit to India, BNP leader Ms Khaleda Zia has promised to be more co-operative to India, as have other leaders in Bangladesh. Such apparently welcome assertions have not evoked much optimism among secularists in Bangladesh or India, going by experience. Except for the vocal assurances, there is no indication that Islamic militancy in Bangladesh’s body politic would not revive in the event of an Awami League electoral defeat.
The conclusion of the water sharing and the transit treaty would have been a fitting climax to what has been a very positive chapter in Indo-Bangla bilateral relations, ending years of distrust and suspicion. The sooner Indian Government accords top priority to achieve this, the better for the country. (IPA Service)
MAMATA’S STONEWALLING OF TEESTA ACCORD
INDIAN INTERESTS WILL BE HURT
Ashis Biswas - 2012-11-30 12:17
In the long term, Ms Mamata Banerjee’s stonewalling of the proposed Teesta water sharing accord may hurt India far more than Bangladesh.