Final settlement of the border dispute is an important requisite for optimising the positive facet of India-China relations – the border dispute must finally be put out of the way. And so, urgently needed are effective steps to end the border dispute. There is a feeling that final settlement of the borders is complicated and should be put on the backburner. But that would be a mistake. Actually, the final settlement is just a step away from the ground that has already been covered.

A proposal similar to the Chou En-lai formula was endorsed by Deng Hsiao-ping, the leader who transformed China, from which followed constructive forward steps and a promising move for solution during the Narasimha Rao visit to China. The formulation of what was termed the ‘Principles’ on which the solution should rest served as a guideline.

Pursuing a pragmatic solution of the boundary dispute, negotiations through a high-level panel covered much ground in the last decade. But for some time, progress seems to have stalled. Global factors, distrust generated by legacy of 1962, happenings in Tibet have all rolled up hampering solution. But the time has now come to end the logjam and give the final push to settle the border dispute.

To achieve this onerous task, some special steps are needed. Only then can the obstacles be cleared. What are these steps?

(a) The Line of Actual Control has been in operation for over a decade. It can, with certain amendments, be transformed into the final border. Only a package deal, in which the eastern and western sectors are taken together, can accomplish this.

(b) This package deal can be clinched only at the political apex level.

(c) Channel two diplomacy and political missions on both sides such as the recent high-level political team from China are deployed to clear sensitive points in the varied interpretations of the Line of Actual Control. The divergent interpretations of the Line of Actual Control relate to small territorial adjustments, and heavens would not fall if these small patches of land in the high hills were to go either way. Yet the sensitivities should as far as possible be removed.

(d) For instance, on the eastern segment, the main sensitive point is Tawang, which houses a famous Buddhist monastery. China perhaps is worried that the monastery could be used for rousing Tibetan insurgency, while India has to respect sentiment of the Buddhist population of Arunachal, more so, since Tawang, according to Indian interpretation, is below the McMahon Line. On the Western segment, the Chinese have at some points moved up beyond the original delineation of the Aksai China border. These areas should be restored to Ladakh, in keeping with the ‘Principles’ evolved by both sides for settling disputed points.

(e) Consensus among main political parties is needed in India, such as the Congress and BJP, over terms of the package deal to obtain acceptability in the two countries.

The final settlement requires that China with its larger clout should show bigger response on ticklish points. On its part, the Chinese leadership would be influenced by the overall relationship – not only economic but also political and strategic.

Lately, there have been fair indications from the Chinese side that it is keen to build a healthy relationship with India. Beijing has welcomed Ratan Tata’s statement that the 1962 chapter should be closed and a cooperative relationship built by the two countries. One notes that while there has been tremendous anguish in India over the 1962 debacle, in Beijing there is silence – no tom-tomming of China’s military superiority. India and China, officials in Beijing say, are partners in trade and wider cooperation, not adversaries.

The Chinese political level team on visit to India, meeting leadership of the political parties, has been an important indicator. India too should undertake political-level missions and clear the way for settlement by initiating channel two missions to tackle specific aspects of the dispute, and the wider strategic relationship.

One should not miss the point that India-China relations fall into a class of their own. History and demography show this. Their huge populations and the vast territories that the two occupy pose similar basic problems, compounded by their parallel civilisational past – development of empires, knowledge-based achievements in different spheres, to their being subjected to colonialism of different patterns. The mutual sympathies that took shape from Tagore and Nehru to Sun Yatsen, including the Medical Mission of Dwarkanath Kotnis, sprang from sympathy in the anti-colonial fight.

The border clashes of 1962, however, marked an abrupt breach in this past of friendship and knowledge-based exchange. Taken together with subsequent brisk development of trade and the promise of significant economic interaction, they denote a new chapter of their relations based on nation-building in the twenty-first century – both in the domestic and international spheres.

India and China are presently embroiled in a stupendous domestic struggle for nation-building, each facing tough political and economic tasks. While their economies are in buoyancy, the political edifices of both are rocking.

On the strategic global front, equilibrium between the main players – United and China in particular – appears far away. Where does India stand? India has to exercise its options based on its national interests, certainly. But perhaps to India, destiny casts a bigger role – in favour of global cooperation and peace – intervening so that the frightful vista of wars too horrendous to contemplate is ruled out. (IPA Service)