It may have also been misled by New Delhi's earlier meekness to Chinese belligerence and discourtesy such as the summoning of the Indian ambassador in Beijing at 2 a.m. and the decision by India to officially boycott the inauguration of a Buddhist stupa by the Dalai Lama at a park near the banks of the Yamuna.

But it is a different India now. Not only is it boosting its military presence and commissioning old airfields near the border, it has summarily rejected China's objections to the Dalai Lama's visit to Arunachal Pradesh, protested against Chinese developmental activities in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), imposed curbs on visas, sought information on the building of a dam on the Chinese side of the Brahmaputra and even mentioned the “T” word to hint that the Tibet question is not totally closed.

The reasons for India's new assertiveness are obvious. The renewal of the Congress's mandate with an increased majority has clearly made the party and the government more confident than before. So has the signing of the nuclear deal which was hanging fire throughout last year. It has to be recalled that George W. Bush had to intervene personally with Hu Jintao before China ended its filibustering at the IAEA about India's entry to the nuclear club. The decimation of the Left may have also made removed any inhibitions the Congress felt earlier about adopting tough postures towards China.

If these are the explanations for India's new boldness, the reasons why China has chosen to ratchet up the old tensions are less clear. It is possible, however, that Beijing is under pressure on several counts. One is its realization that the Tibetan situation may become worse after the Dalai Lama's retirement or death because there is every chance that the removal of his restraining influence will embolden the young and militant elements among the Tibetan exiles to come to the fore.

China probably now regrets that it never took the Tibetan pontiff's offer of a negotiated peace more seriously. Instead, it chose to vilify him as a “splittist” and a “wolf in monk's clothing” in the hope that his denigration and subsequent departure would mark the end of the Tibetan “problem” for it. Now, the opposite may happen. And it is apparently to guard against such a possibility that China is so eager to grab Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh, which is an important centre of Tibetan Buddhism. Hence, Beijing's unilateral rejection of the 2005 agreement not to include inhabited areas in the settlement of the border dispute.

The restiveness of the Buddhists in Tibet is compounded by the signs of revolt by the Muslims in Xinjiang. China is well aware that simultaneous disturbances in the two provinces will not be easy to control without the use of excessive force, which, in turn, will remind everyone in the world that nothing has changed in China since the Tiananmen Square massacre.

If Tibet and Xinjiang are reminders (along with Taiwan) that the nuclear-armed Middle Kingdom has been unable to establish control over what it regards as its own territories, let alone browbeat others, Pakistan's degeneration into a failed state signifies the loss of an important tool for harassing India. For nearly six decades, China had bolstered Pakistan to keep India off-balance. But the setback it suffered by the secession of Bangladesh is now made worse by Pakistan's collapse into a dysfunctional state.

Even China's economic growth has its negative side since it has engendered unrest in the countryside over the growing rich-poor divide. In contrast, India's economic reforms have been a less turbulent affair because of the safety-valves provided by its democracy. Not surprisingly, it is increasingly felt that India is a safer destination for business ventures than China whose surface calm enforced by totalitarian conditions may be deceptive.

In 1962, China wanted to send a message to countries in its neighbourhood that it, rather than India, was the real emerging giant. As Han Suyin wrote in her book on Zhou Enlai, Eldest Son, “China's prestige in Asia was immensely enhanced. Six countries - Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Ghana, Pakistan, Indonesia and the United Arab Republic - joined in December to urge negotiations. Nehru refused.”

In 2009, too, China may have thought of extracting concessions from India by flexing its muscles, especially in Arunachal Pradesh, which it calls Southern Tibet. But it has come up against a more robust India. (IPA Service)