They expressed their reservations as news of army and para military personnel moving deep into the jungles of the Bodo dominated districts of Assam started trickling in. There were reports of security personnel seizing several bikes as well as ammunition from abandoned camps run by the militants during their raids. There have been no reports so far of any encounters in the insurgency-affected districts of Sonitpur, Chirang or Kokrajhar.

While on the run and hiding in the forests, the militants have continued to set fire to non-tribal villages at nights after plundering them, driving out the villagers. They have also hurled grenades at the pursuing para military personnel. Fighting on their 'home' turf, they have fully utilised their knowledge of local conditions, topography, languages and other advantages, giving them a built-in edge over their better armed pursuers.

Guwahati-based observers wonder why the central and state governments, justifiably shocked over the most brutal massacre of innocent non-tribals in recent years, gave so much advance publicity to the new official operation. The BJP-run Centre clearly wanted to drive home a message that it was stronger than the erstwhile UPA Government. This was why the Union Home Minister Rajnath Singh announced an official resolve to take on the Bodo insurgent outfit the NDFB (Sangbijit) head on, following it up with the prompt despatch of armed troops backed by helicopters to the affected areas.

While this was understandable, it also gave the insurgents plenty of time to get away and regroup in a planned manner as they retreated deeper into their jungle hideouts with which even Assam-based security personnel are not very familiar. Despite decades of Bodo insurgency, the number of Assam policemen who understand the language of the militants is not large. This deficiency has played a major role in the state policemen's failure to act on a broad advance warning of an impending strike by central agencies and their inability to understand what the militants were actually saying even as they intercepted their communications! And Central forces have to work in co-ordination all the time with the state police.

Despite this, the state police have built up over the years an impressive knowledge base about Bodo insurgent organisations. The NDFB(S) is a breakaway offshoot of the old NDFB outfit led by Ranjan Daimary, which enjoys links with the Christian lobby in the Northeast. The Daimary group itself had broken away from the united NDFB earlier. Currently, the Daimary group and the older NDFB group are both in a dialogue mode with the central government.

The Sangbijit or the NDFB(S) faction differs from the other two factions in that it stands for a separate state for the Bodos, not a tribal autonomy package. The splintering of the Bodo agitation for regional identity in recent years is a testimony to the ethnic complications that remained unresolved even after the Bodo Autonomy accord signed between the Centre, Assam (both Congress ruled at the time) and Bodo leaders in the early nineties.

Within the present Bodo autonomous area, the Bodos are in a minority to the combined Assamiya, Bengali (Hindu and Muslim) and the migrant tribal populations from erstwhile Bihar, Orissa and other areas. The creation of the autonomous region led to much bitterness between the centre and Assam. Assamiya leaders including Mr, Prafulla Mohanta of the AGP, maintain that the Congress ruled centre had encouraged Bodo militancy to smother the demands of the majority Assamiya whom the Bodos regard as outsiders. Given this background, no wonder that armed Bodo militants have been attacking the tribals and Bangladeshi Muslim immigrants settled in the autonomous areas with impunity over the years, with hardly any retribution.

Now the BJP- run administration with its emphasis and determination to run the country effectively under a strong unitary centre, wants to put everyone on notice that such ethnic cleansing/killings would no longer be tolerated. This was why it sent out a strong warning to the militants, involving army units along with air support. It remains to be seen how effective this proves in the long run.

In contrast, the 2003 joint anti-insurgency operation by Indian and Bhutanese armies had been carried out without much publicity, advance or otherwise. Camps run by the ULFA, the NDFB and the KLO (all banned organisations) had been attacked and destroyed. Despite their later attempts, no insurgent group succeeded in setting up new training camps /shelters within Bhutan or along the Indo-Bhutan border since.

While the Indo-Bhutan and Indo-Myanmar borders have been sealed and the Governments of all three countries have pledged to co-operate in the ongoing operation, doubts remain as to its success. Asks a Guwahati-based analyst, 'Who is to stop the militants who number at the most around 20/25, from dumping /hiding their weapons and ammunition in the remote jungles or villages friendly to them, put on ordinary clothes and then simply vanishing among local people in Kokrajhar or even Guwahati, for that matter ? They have had hours, even days, to plan their next move.' Worse, the present exercise, unless it succeeds in arresting top NDFB(S) leaders, will only bring in fresh harassment and anger among innocent Bodos as the troops begin their interrogation and other security-related work.

Clearly both the centre and the state have their work cut out in the future. (IPA Service)